Sustaining Honesty in Public Service:The Role of Selection by Barfort, Sebastian et al.
u n i ve r s i t y  o f  co pe n h ag e n  
Sustaining Honesty in Public Service
The Role of Selection
Barfort, Sebastian; Harmon, Nikolaj Arpe; Hjorth, Frederik Georg; Olsen, Asmus Leth
Published in:
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
DOI:
10.1257/pol.20170688
Publication date:
2019
Document version
Peer reviewed version
Citation for published version (APA):
Barfort, S., Harmon, N. A., Hjorth, F. G., & Olsen, A. L. (2019). Sustaining Honesty in Public Service: The Role
of Selection. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 11(4), 96-123. https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20170688
Download date: 09. Oct. 2020
Sustaining Honesty in Public Service:
The Role of Selection∗
Sebastian Barfort† Nikolaj A. Harmon‡ Frederik Hjorth§
Asmus Leth Olsen¶
This version: August 2018
First version: September 2015
Abstract
We study the role of self-selection into public service in sustaining honesty in the
public sector. Focusing on the world’s least corrupt country, Denmark, we use a
survey experiment to document strong self-selection of more honest individuals
into public service. This result differs sharply from existing findings from more
corrupt settings. Differences in pro-social vs. pecuniary motivation appear central
to the observed selection pattern. Dishonest individuals are more pecuniarily
motivated and self-select out of public service and into higher-paying private sector
jobs. Accordingly, we find that increasing public sector wages would attract more
dishonest candidates to public service in Denmark.
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1 Introduction
Research on corruption has tended to emphasize formal differences in individual incentives
for misuse of public office, emphasizing monitoring and punishment as deterrents from
engaging in corrupt behavior. While this focus has been very fruitful (see Olken and
Pande 2012 for a recent survey), recent evidence have suggested that individual attributes
such as cultural values may also play a prominent role (Fisman et al. 2015; Fisman and
Miguel 2007).
This paper explores the role of individual selection in generating an equilibrium of
honesty and low corruption in public service. Using Denmark as a low-corruption case
study, we ask whether potential candidates for public service jobs differ in their inherent
propensity for dishonest behavior, and if so whether systematic self-selection of honest
types into public service may be one channel that helps sustain a low level of corruption.
To draw lessons for combatting corruption in other settings, we further ask how the
observed selection pattern is related to other individual attributes, as well as the level of
public sector wages.
Theory provides ambiguous predictions regarding the questions we pose. The inherent
propensity for dishonesty could differ significantly across potential candidates for public
service or could be relatively constant within a country. Moreover, even if dishonesty
does vary across potential public service candidates, it is unclear how dishonesty should
relate to preferences for entering public service. On the one hand, the relatively low
level of public sector corruption in Denmark could discourage dishonest individuals from
entering this sector. On the other hand, the Danish public sector is not immune to
rent extraction (Amore and Bennedsen 2013), and the sheer size of public budgets in
Denmark means that even small scale rent extraction in the public sector may be very
lucrative for dishonest individuals. Finally, to the extent that dishonesty correlates with
other individual attributes that shape job preferences, such as risk aversion or pro-social
motivation, this may further complicate the observed selection pattern.
To provide empirical guidance on these questions, we conduct a survey experiment
with students in the fields of law, economics, and political science at the University of
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Copenhagen in Denmark. Given its consistent ranking as the least corrupt country in
the world, Denmark is a useful benchmark for studying how countries can sustain low
levels of corruption. For studying selection into public service, the particular population
of students we focus on is very well suited. They face a very clear choice between public
service and private sector careers and make up an important part of the public sector
workforce.
We first examine the extent of heterogeneity in dishonesty and how this heterogeneity is
related to preferences for entering public service. We adopt the experimental methodology
of Hanna and Wang (2017) and subject students to a standard set of cheating tasks
building on Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013). In our implementation of the tasks,
students can win money by correctly guessing the outcome of a series of dice rolls but are
allowed to see the outcome of each roll before reporting their guess. Students therefore
have the option of winning dishonestly by misreporting their guess, knowing that it can
never be proven whether in fact they were dishonest. Comparing the distribution of
successful guesses in the dice game to the expected distribution without lying, however,
allows us to construct estimates of individual propensities for dishonesty.
The cheating tasks reveal extensive heterogeneity among potential candidates for
public service. We estimate that 14-17 percent of respondents barely cheat at all, while
17-23 percent cheat practically all the time. The remaining respondents fall somewhere
in between, resulting in a standard deviation of cheat rates across individuals of 0.39.
Relating dishonesty to job preferences, we find clear evidence of positive self-selection into
public service, as honest individuals in Denmark are systematically more likely to want to
enter public service. Students ranking public administration as one of their top two job
choices cheat 10 percentage points less than other students.
To shed some some light on why this selection pattern exists, we next examine how
dishonesty and job preferences correlate with other attributes. We find no evidence that
ability or risk preferences correlate with dishonesty. Differences in pro-social vs. pecuniary
motivation, however, turn out to be strong predictors of both dishonesty and job preferences.
Pro-social individuals who donate more in a dictator game are both more honest and
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more likely to prefer a public service career. Conversely, pecuniarily motivated individuals
who view the wage level as a particularly important job characteristic are less honest
and less likely to prefer a public service career. This can explain a significant part of
the observed selection pattern; controlling for two simple measures of pro-sociality and
pecuniary motivation reduces the relationship between dishonesty and preferences for
public service by 30 percent.
Finally, we examine how the observed selection pattern is related to the level of public
sector wages. Public sector jobs in Denmark are characterized by relatively low wages
compared to the private sector. Combined with our findings regarding pro-sociality and
pecuniary motivation, this suggests that the observed selection pattern may reflect that
more pecuniarily motivated dishonest individuals self-select out of the Danish public
sector due to its relatively low wage level. We provide evidence in favor of this hypothesis
by analyzing a set of counterfactual job preference question that ask students to choose
between a job in the public and the private sector given different counterfactual relative
wage levels. These show that increases in the level of public sector wages would attract
more dishonest candidates to public service.
The idea that individuals may differ in their inherent propensity for dishonesty has a
long tradition in the theoretical literature on corruption (Lui 1986; Cadot 1987; Andvig
and Moene 1990) and is supported empirically by the fact that personality traits predict
corrupt behavior (Callen et al. 2015). The role of selection on the dishonesty dimension
has also received theoretical attention (Caselli and Morelli 2004; Besley 2004; Bernheim
and Kartik 2014). In particular, our finding that higher public sector wages attract more
dishonest candidates mirror the theoretical predictions regarding the effect of politician
salaries in the influential work of Besley (2004). Our result that the observed selection
pattern is related to differences in pro-social vs. pecuniary motivation also directly relates
to the literature on job choice and extrinsic vs. intrinsic motivation (Benabou and Tirole
2003; Besley and Ghatak 2005; Delfgaauw and Dur 2007).
Empirically, a number of recent papers have examined selection into public service.1
1Dal Bó, Finan, and Rossi (2013), Ashraf, Bandiera, and Lee (2016), and Deserranno (2016) use
field experiments to examine how pecuniary incentives affect selection into public service jobs in Mexico,
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However, only a handful of empirical papers have focused on dishonesty. Closest to the
present paper are Hanna and Wang (2017), who use the same experimental methodology
to show that dishonest university students are more likely to want to enter public service
in India. Similarly, Banerjee, Baul, and Rosenblat (2015) run a corruption experiment
at two different Indian universities and find more dishonest behavior at the university
targeting public service careers. Finally, Alatas et al. (2009) find no correlation between
preferences for working in the public sector and bribing behavior in an explicit corruption
game among Indonesian students.
To our knowledge, this paper is the first to examine dishonesty and selection into public
service in a low-corruption environment and is also the first to document a positive selection
pattern where honest individuals systematically prefer public service. Additionally, our
paper provides the first evidence that the level of public sector wages may impact the
selection of honest and dishonest individuals into public service.
Besides the literature on corruption and selection into public service, our paper builds
on a larger experimental literature exploring the nature and causes of dishonest behavior
across societies (e.g. Gino, Ayal, and Ariely 2009; Shalvi et al. 2011; Weisel and Shalvi
2015; Gächter and Schulz 2016; Houser et al. 2016). Besides Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi
(2013) and Hanna and Wang (2017), the design of our experimental dishonesty task draws
particularly on Jiang (2013). Finally, by using experimental methods to study questions
specifically related to corruption, our paper also relates to the experimental literature on
corruption or bribery games (see Abbink and Serra 2012 for a recent survey).
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we lay out the context and aim of the
study. In Section 3 we present the survey experiment used to construct the key variables
of the study. In Section 4 we present the main results regarding dishonesty and selection
into public service. In Section 5 we present additional results regarding the mechanisms
behind the observed selection pattern and consider robustness. Section 6 concludes.
Zambia and Uganda in various dimensions, including ability and pro-social preferences. Combining survey
and experimental data, Kolstad and Lindkvist (2013) and Serra, Serneels, and Barr (2011) examine how
pro-social preferences correlate with wanting to work in the public sector in Tanzania and with working
in the non-profit sector in Ethiopia. Buurman et al. (2012) examine whether public sector employees
in the Netherlands differ in risk preference or their level of altruism. Finan, Olken, and Pande (2015)
provides a broader survey.
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2 Context, Framework, and Aim of the Study
The present paper is motivated by the juxtaposition of two simple observations: The
first observation is that some countries seem to be perennial high performers when it
comes to mainting a low level of corruption. While many contries struggle with high level
of corruptions, some countries have been consistently able to sustain an equilibrium of
honesty and low corruption in public service.
The second observation is that differences in individuals’ inherent propensity for
dishonesty may play a role in shaping corruption. Whether a public official engages in
corrupt behavior will depend on many institutional features of the environment he faces
such as monitoring and punishment schemes and the size of the potential gains. In addition
to these factors, however, it may also be influenced by his own inherent propensity for
engaging in dishonest behavior. For a given level of monitoring and other factors, a public
sector that primarily attracts inherently honest employees may thus exhibit lower levels
of fraudulent behavior than one that attracts more dishonest individuals.
Put together these two observations raise the question of whether systematic selection
of honest individuals into public service may be one reason that some countries are able
to maintain persistent low levels of corruption. With this hypothesis in mind, the main
aim of our analysis is to examine whether there is systematic self-selection of honest (or
dishonest) individuals into public service in one of the world’s least corrupt countries,
Denmark. Additionally, we aim to shed some light on possible mechanisms that explain
the observed selection pattern.
In the rest of this section, we first lay out the conceptual framework for our analysis
and then describe the particular empirical context we examine.
2.1 Dishonesty: Conceptual Framework
At the heart of this paper is the idea that when faced with the same exact situation, some
individuals may be more likely to be dishonest than others. The way we conceptualize
individual dishonesty is a simple application of this idea: Throughout the paper when we
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say that some individual A is inherently more dishonest (or have a higher propensity for
dishonesty) than some individual B, we simply mean that in a given situation, individual
A has a higher likelihood of engaging in dishonest behavior than B.
There are several things to note about this defintion: First, the definition above does
not take a stand on why some individuals are more dishonest. For example, individual A
may be more likely to engage in dishonest behavior because dishonesty is an important
fundamental personality trait for him, or because his particular risk preferences, his level of
pro-sociality or his other characteristics makes dishonesty more attractive or palatable. In
either case we may worry that individual A would engage in more corrupt behavior during
a potential public service career. Accordingly, for the main part of the paper, we examine
the unconditional relationship between dishonesty and job preferences without controlling
for any other variables that may explain or correlate with dishonest behavior. When we
turn to shedding light on the mechanisms behind the observed selection pattern, however,
we do examine specifically how dishonesty correlates with other individual variables. As
we shall see, the evidence suggest that dishonesty is particularly strongly correlated with
differences in pro-social vs pecuniary motivation.
Second, the defintion above implicitly assumes that individual dishonesty is relatively
stable across settings. If the ranking of individuals in terms of dishonesty is wildly different
in different settings, it makes little sense to talk of differences in overall dishonesty. As
we return to in Section 3, however, previous work has documented that individuals who
behave more dishonestly in our experimental dishonesty task also tend to behave more
dishonestly in a range of other settings. This suggests that individual dishonesty does
indeed exhibit stability across settings.
Finally, there are a number of different theories for why indvidual dishonesty (as
defined above) may be positively or negatively correlated with preferences for a public
service career. We return to these in Section 5, after we have presented our main result
regarding the overall selection pattern.
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2.2 Study Setting: Denmark
Most research on corruption focuses on high-corruption settings and aims to understand
why corruption is so prevalent or how it is affected by policy changes. This paper takes
the opposite approach. We focus on a benchmark country that has been successful in
maintaining a consistently low level of corruption and try to shed light on how this low
corruption equilibrium is being sustained.
Accordingly, the setting of the study is Denmark. For studying how to sustain honesty
in public service, Denmark is a natural benchmark country given its consistent ranking
among the very least corrupt countries in the world. Figure 1 shows the levels of corruption
in different countries 1996-2014 as measured by the commonly used Transparency Interna-
tional’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), with Denmark highlighted (Transparency
International 2016). Since 2007 Denmark has ranked as the least corrupt country in the
CPI every year but two, and in the history of the CPI Denmark has never ranked lower
than fourth.2
2.3 Study Population
Within Denmark, the population we study consists of university students in the fields of
law, economics, and political science. Higher education is highly specialized in Denmark
and practically all university students complete both a bachelor and a master’s degree in
their chosen field of study, which in turn strongly influences the jobs available to them
upon graduation.
For the purpose of our study, students in law, economics, and political science are
ideal for two reasons: First, these students face a very clear choice between entering the
private sector or going into public service. For current employees with a background in
economics, law, or political science, around 46 percent work in the public sector, mostly in
public administration, and 54 percent in the private sector, typically in finance, law firms,
and lobbying organizations. Second, this population is large and influential enough to
2This pattern is not exclusive to the CPI. For example, the World Bank Governance Indicator “Control
of Corruption”, detailed in Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2010), has ranked Denmark as the least
corrupt country in the world every year since 2007 and never ranked Denmark lower than second.
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actually affect the corruption level of the public sector. About 60 percent of all state-level
employees in administrative functions have a background in one of the three fields we
study or a closely related field. They are also dominant at the top level of the public
sector: 100 percent of current deputy secretaries and about 40 percent of members of
parliament hold a degree in one of the three fields.
2.4 Possibilities for Corruption
Given the motivation for our study, it is worth considering what types of corrupt behavior
our student population can undertake in their public service careers. For those entering
public administration at the local level, many of them will be engaged in direct adminis-
trative work that affect individual citizens and businesses and offers the opportunity of
bribe-taking or other forms of misbehavior. Amore and Bennedsen (2013), for example,
have documented rent extraction in the procurement of local public services in Denmark.
In other instances, potential corruption could take a more indirect form. Some graduates
work in offices which help develop and prepare legislative input to elected officials. These
may be influenced into serving the interests of private companies or other organizations.
Additionally, our student population may also engage in smaller scale dishonesty at their
workplace such as fraudulent absenteeism or the abuse of expense accounts.
As discussed in the previous section, it is by all accounts rare that any Danish public
employee engages in corrupt behavior. However, this does not imply that there is no
corruption in Denmark or that it is impossible for public sector employees to take advantage
of the corruption opportunities described above. A recent corruption scandal involving
the IT company Atea showcases how dishonesty, in the form of bribe-taking, can be found
in rare but serious cases throughout the Danish administrative system. Since 2015 Danish
authorities and state prosecution have indicted multiple state, regional, and local public
employees for accepting bribes from Atea. The bribes have been given with the aim of
providing Atea with a more favorable bidding position in public procurement auctions.
The indictments have up until this point lead to more than 10 convictions of higher-level
public employees from many branches of government including the Ministry of Foreign
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Affairs, The Region of Southern Denmark, the Municipality of Copenhagen, and the
Danish state railways. The bribes were mostly given in the form of gifts, such as paid trips
or discounts on personal IT equipment, and ranged in value from 1,000 USDs to 50,000
USDs. The indicted have for the most part been employed in positions and organizations
that are dominated by employees with the same educational background as the students
in our sample.
In sum, graduates from our student population face serious opportunities for corrupt
behavior in their public service careers. As a reflection of the sustained low corruption level
in Denmark, however, they rarely take advantage of these opportunities. One explanation
for this is likely the monitoring schemes and institutional setup of the Danish public sector.
Another, complementary explanation may be however, that graduates who actually choose
a public service career tend to be systematically very honest individuals who often refrain
from corrupt behavior even in cases where they could get away with it. The next section
explains the data we use to examine dishonesty and selection into public service within
our student population.
3 Data and Experimental Design
Our empirical analysis is based on an online survey experiment conducted at the University
of Copenhagen during December 2014. The university administration provided us with
complete lists of everyone who enrolled as undergraduates in law, economics, and political
science, including student e-mail addresses. From these lists random samples of 1,000
students who enrolled over the years 2009-2011 and 2013-20143 were drawn from each of
the three fields and were invited to participate in the survey experiment.4 The invitation
to participate was sent as an e-mail with a link to the survey along with a username and
password.5 Participants were told that the survey dealt with their attitudes to various
3Students who enrolled prior to 2009 were not invited as many of them have graduated and therefore
may no longer use their student e-mail. Pilot studies were run on students enrolling in 2012, so these
were not invited so as to not contaminate the subject pool.
4A translated version of the invitation mail can be found in Appendix A.10.
5The experiment was run using a software called “ILab” developed by Andreas Gotfredsen and
Alexander Sebald.
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topics and “how they acted in situations characterized by uncertainty.” The latter referred
to the various incentivized games which they would encounter in the survey and which
will be outlined in detail below. Participants were also told that they would be paid to
participate. In accordance with the actual outcomes, participants were informed that
the average participant would earn no less than 50 DKK (8 USD), that the maximum
payoff was above 300 DKK (50 USD), and that the survey would take approximately 20
minutes to complete.6 For comparison, the student population in question would in a
typical student job usually receive a union-defined hourly wage of about 110 DKK (18
USD), corresponding to 37 DKK (6 USD) per 20 minutes.
In total 863 students completed the survey. From these we drop one individual who
experienced technical difficulties during the main dishonesty experiment in the survey,
leaving us with a base sample of 862 participants. In terms of representativeness, our
sampling scheme by definition implies that the pool of invitees is statistically representative
within each field of study. At the end of Section 5 and in Appendix A.9, we examine
potential issues related to selective non-participation by exploiting the availability of
administrative university data for non-participants.
3.1 Measuring Dishonesty: Experimental Dice Task
The first main purpose of our survey experiment is to measure respondents’ inherent
propensities for dishonesty. We follow Hanna and Wang (2017) and measure dishonesty
using a repeated variation of the dice-under-cup game approach from Fischbacher and
Föllmi-Heusi (2013). Behavior in these types of games have become a widely used measure
of dishonesty (see for example Shalvi, Eldar, and Bereby-Meyer 2012; Gneezy, Rockenbach,
and Serra-Garcia 2013; Hilbig and Hessler 2013; Cohn, Fehr, and Maréchal 2014; Ariely et
al. 2014) and has been shown to predict real-world dishonest behavior and rule breaking
in a range of settings (Cohn, Maréchal, and Noll 2015; Cohn and Maréchal 2015). Given
that the present paper is motivated by understanding public sector corruption, we note
6These announcements were based on observed outcomes in pilot studies and ended up closely mirroring
actual outcomes. The realized maximum payoff for a participant was 315 DKK (53 USD) and the average
payoff was 80 DKK (13 USD). The median time from opening the survey to completion was 25 minutes.
At the time of the survey experiment 1 USD equaled about 6 DKK.
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in particular that dishonesty in dice under cup games has been shown to predict actual
fraudulent behavior among public sector employees (Hanna and Wang 2017).
For our specific implementation of the dice under cup approach, we build on the
computer-based variation of Jiang (2013).7 Our implementation works as follows:8 At
four different points in the survey experiment, participants were asked to play ten rounds
of a dice guessing game. Students were told that the game was intended to test how they
“guess in situations characterized by randomness” and that they could win money in the
game by correctly guessing the outcome of a dice roll. In each round of the dice game
respondents were first asked to think of a number between 1 and 6 that they expected the
dice to show after the dice roll. Students then clicked “next” while keeping their guess in
mind. A dice was rolled on screen and the outcome of the dice roll was reported. The
participants were then asked to report their guess while the actual outcome of the dice
roll was still displayed. On the following screen the payoff from the round was reported.
Reporting a correct guess yielded a gain of 2 DKK (0.33 USD) relative to an incorrect
one.9
The point of the dice guessing game is that in each round, respondents have the option
of winning dishonestly by reporting the actual outcome of the dice roll regardless of what
their initial guess was. Moreover, a strength of the design is that respondents are not
explicitly primed to think about dishonesty and respondents know in each round that it can
never be revealed whether in fact they reported their guess honestly.10 Because an honest
individual always has a one-in-six chance of correctly guessing each dice roll, however,
we can make statistical statements about individual dishonesty after observing more
7Our motivation for using the computer-based implementation is that it can be conducted online.
Using an online implementation allowed us to systematically sample and invite participations directly
from the university e-mail database, while simultaneously keeping participation costs low and ensuring
as high a participation rate as possible. Both of these features are important for dealing with the issue
of sample representativeness, which is particularly critical given that our focus is on estimating the
relationship between job preferences and dishonesty in the underlying population.
8Screen caps of the game as viewed by the respondents, including exact translations of all instructions
for the game, are presented in Appendix A.11.
9In our pilot studies, we explicitly tested whether behavior depended on the level of payoffs or gains
and found no evidence of stakes-dependency in our setting.
10One may still worry that upon realizing that they can lie undetected in the game, students implicitly
feel that being dishonest is the point of the game. In an attempt to mitigate this type of experimental
demand, we concluded the introduction screen by stating that: “it is important that you are careful about
remembering and reporting the exact number on which you guessed prior to rolling the die”.
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repetitions of the game. The next section formalizes this and presents the individual-level
estimate of dishonesty that we use in our analysis.
3.2 Measuring Dishonesty: Econometrics
The data from our dice under cup task consists of a sample of N respondents, which we
index by i. Each respondent participates in a series of K rounds of a dice game, which we
index by k. As described above, our experiment has N = 862 and K = 40. In each round
the respondent can either win or lose. The rounds are independent of each other with a
constant probability of winning of p∗. In our experiment the probability of (truthfully)
guessing a dice roll is one in six so p∗ = 16 in our case. We do not directly observe whether
respondents win or lose however. For each round and each respondent, we instead observe
a self-reported measure of whether the respondent won or not, where respondents are free
to report dishonestly. We let yik be an indicator variable for whether respondent i reported
winning in round k. In the context of our implementation of the dice guessing game, yik
is simply an indicator for whether the reported guess matches the actual dice roll. We let
Yi =
∑K
k=1 yik denote the total number of wins (total number of correct guesses) reported
by respondent i.
We introduce heterogeneity in the propensity for being dishonest by assuming that
when reporting the outcome of a given round, respondent i reports dishonestly some
fraction θi ∈ [0, 1] of the time.11 We further make the assumption that if reporting
dishonestly, a respondent reports a win for sure in that round. Otherwise he or she
reports the truth. The individual-specific θi therefore captures respondent i’s propensity
for dishonesty and we refer to it as respondent i’s cheat rate.
In order to examine the relationship between cheat rates, job preferences and
other attributes, we will construct individual measures of each respondent’s cheat rate.
The probability of observing a win for a respondent with a given cheat rate, θi, is
11Note that here we do not take stance on whether cheating behavior exhibits dependence over time. In
the construction of our cheat rate estimator, we only require weak stationarity so that the (unconditional)
probability of cheating (and thus of reporting a win) is the same in any given round. In the appendix,
however, when deriving the variance of our cheat rate estimator and developing our estimator of the full
distribution of dishonesty, we do it under the assumption that cheating behavior is independent over time
for a given individual.
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P
(
yik = E
(
yik
∣∣∣θi) = 1∣∣∣θi) = p∗ + (1 − p∗)θi. From this we can construct an unbiased
Method of Moments estimator of i’s cheat rate by replacing population moments with
empirical moments and rearranging:12
̂CheatRatei =
6
5 ·
(
Yi
40 −
1
6
)
We refer to this as individual i‘s estimated cheat rate and use this as our main measure
of individuals’ propensity for dishonesty.
Three properties of the measure are worth highlighting here:
First, the inherent randomness in whether dice rolls match respondents’ (honest)
guesses implies that the estimated cheat rate suffers from measurement error. As we show
in Section A.1 in the appendix, however, this measurement error is classical. Using the
estimated cheat rate as the outcome variable in a regression therefore provides consistent
estimates of the relationship between the true cheat rate and the included covariates under
the usual conditions.
Second, despite not affecting the consistency of our estimates, the measurement error
in the estimated cheat rate does lower the precision of our estimates. In Section A.1 of the
appendix we invoke simple assumptions on the time dependence of dishonest behavior to
show that the amount of measurement error is decreasing in the number of dice guessing
rounds that each person plays and increasing in the true probability of a correct guess.
This motivates our chosen implementation of the dice guessing game which has many
rounds and a low win probability in each round.
Third, because our estimated cheat rate is a linear transformation of the total number
of reported wins, alternative approaches that use the raw number of correct guesses (or
total winnings) as measures of dishonesty would simply rescale the regression results we
present later.
Given the properties above, the main analysis of the paper involves regressing respon-
12Unbiasedness is easily seen from E( ̂CheatRatei|θi) = 11−p∗ 1K
∑K
k=1 P (yik = 1|θi)− p
∗
1−p∗ = θi. It is
worth noting that the estimated cheat rate will be negative for any respondent who reports winning
fewer than K p
∗
1−p∗ times, in spite of the fact that in fact θi ≥ 0 by assumption. It is possible to define
different estimators that are non-negative, however, these estimator will not be unbiased and are therefore
unattractive for our purposes (see section A.1 in the appendix).
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dents’ estimated cheat rates on other characteristics, in particular preferences for entering
public service. We note, however, that one can also use the data from our experimental
dice task to estimate the full distribution of dishonesty in the population, as well as how
this distribution relates to job preferences. In Sections A.1 and A.2 of the appendix we
discuss, develop and implement such estimators in detail.
3.3 Measuring Job Preferences
The second key variable in the empirical analysis is the students’ preferences for public
service jobs. For our main measure of job preferences, we asked students to imagine that
they have obtained their academic degree and are now free to choose between jobs. In
this scenario they were then asked to rank eight categories based on the most common
jobs held by graduates from our student population: public administration, private sector
job in the financial sector, private sector job in a political party or lobby organization,
private sector job within public relations, private sector job in a law firm, a job in the
Danish Central Bank, other public sector job, or other private sector job. These particular
categories were chosen to match the eight most common industry categories for our study
population in the official Danish employment statistics. As noted, public administration is
by far the most important public service career for our population. For our main measure
of students’ preferences for entering public service, we therefore focus on the rank given
to public administration.
For robustness, we also elicited additional measures of job preferences. In one question,
we asked students to report the likelihood of them ending up in each of the eight job
categories described above.13 In addition, we administered a standard 16-item question-
naire measuring Public Service Motivation (PSM), which is often used as an indication of
respondents’ dispositional preferences for working in the public sector (Perry and Wise
1990).14
13To ease students’ way through the survey, we did not require that the reported probabilities sum to a
hundred. In the empirical analysis we rescale them appropriately.
14Given the setup of our survey, we note that all our job preference measures are likely to center on
students preferences for the first job out of university. They may therefore miss potential differences in
long-term career plans.
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Finally, for examining the role played by the level of public sector wages, we subjected all
respondents to nine different counterfactual wage scenarios. In each scenario respondents
were asked to choose between their preferred job in the private sector and their preferred
job in the public sector given a particular wage gap between the two jobs ranging from
the private sector job paying 20,000 DKK (3,300 USD) more per month to the public
sector job paying 20,000 DKK more per month.
3.4 Additional Measures
To examine how dishonesty and self-selection into public service are related to other student
attributes, we included a range of other standard experimental tasks and questions in the
survey experiment. At the beginning of the survey experiment, we asked respondents
to play a simple dictator game. Respondents were given a gift of 15 DKK (2.5 USD).15
They were then offered to get the money transferred to their account when the survey
was finished or donate some or all of the money to one of five charities of their choice.
Furthermore, as they increased their own donation we matched their donation amount
with up to 4 DKK (0.75 USD) using a concave matching schedule.
We also included an incentivized measure of risk aversion at the beginning of the
survey. Students were told that one in ten of them would be randomly selected to enter
into a coin flip lottery at the end of the survey. They were then asked to choose between
five different such lotteries with varying risk profiles.16
As a proxy of ability, we asked students to report their high school GPA. High school
exams are standardized nationally in Denmark and provide a good measure of ability
for the population we study. In the empirical analysis, we standardize GPAs across field
to avoid mechanical correlations stemming from the admissions cut-offs for the different
fields.17
15In pilot studies we experimented with the placement of the dictator game but found no evidence that
the timing of the dictator game mattered for dishonesty behavior or public sector preferences.
16The lotteries were designed based on the range of constant relative risk aversion coefficients reported
for the Danish population in Harrison, Lau, and Rutström (2007). The most risky coin lottery involved a
gain of 200 DKK (33 USD) in case of heads and 0 DKK for tails. The least risky lottery involved a gain
of 80 DKK (16 USD) regardless of the coin flip.
17Admission to different fields in Danish higher education is based high school GPA, with the necessary
GPA varying widely across different fields. This introduces strong mechanical differences in student GPAs
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To get direct measures of students’ preferences regarding job characteristics, we asked
them to rank the following five job characteristics in order of importance: wage level,
work hours and other terms of work, importance, entertainment value, and job security.
Finally, we use data on the students’ gender. Table 1 provides summary statistics. As
the table shows, a few of the observations lack information about some variables. These
are caused by erroneous reporting and a few students experiencing technical issues during
parts of the survey experiment.
4 Main Results: Dishonesty and Self-selection
We start our empirical investigation by examining the variation in dishonest behavior in
our dice guessing experiment. Figure 2 shows the distribution of the observed number of
correct guesses across students in our dice guessing experiment, along with the distribution
of correct guesses that would be expected if students report their guesses completely
honestly. Comparing the expected honest distribution with the actual outcomes in the
experiment, we see evidence of extensive dishonest behavior. For example, the probability
of an honest respondent having 10 or more correct guesses is about 12 percent, yet 73
percent of respondents report 10 or more correct guesses in our sample.
The figure also suggests that the amount of dishonest behavior differs very significantly
across individuals. While many students’ report a number of correct guesses well above
the 99th percentile of the honest distribution, other students actually report fewer correct
guesses than what would be expected under full honesty.18 In Sections A.1 and A.2 of the
appendix, we show how the data in Figure 2 can be used to construct estimators of the
full distribution of dishonesty across individuals if one imposes simple assumptions on the
time dependence of dishonesty. Applying such estimators we find that 14-17 percent of
individuals in our data are practically completely honest and cheat less than 2 percent of
the time, while 17-23 percent are practically completely dishonest and cheat more than
98 percent of the time. The remaining respondents are spread fairly evenly in between,
across fields, which are unrelated to their own career preferences.
18Under full honesty the 99th percentile is 13 correct guesses, while the expected number of correct
guesses is 6.7.
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and the standard deviation of cheat rates across individuals is 0.39.19 Despite facing the
same opportunities and incentives to behave dishonestly in the survey experiment, we
thus see extensive heterogeneity in dishonesty within our pool of potential candidates for
public service.
4.1 Dishonesty and Self-selection into Public Service
Next we turn to the main focus of the paper and examine whether the observed differences
in the propensity for dishonesty are correlated with preferences for a public service career.
We do this in the context of a simple regression that relates individual i’s estimated cheat
rate to an indicator for whether individual i prefers a public service career, PublicServicei.
Here and throughout the paper, we use the estimated cheat rate as the outcome variable
in the regression to deal with the measurement error in our cheat rate estimate:20
̂CheatRatei = β0 + β1PublicServicei + εi
The estimate of β1 in this regression estimates the average gap in individual cheat
rates between individuals that have a preference for a public service career and those who
do not.
Table 2 shows estimates of this regression using different measures of job preferences.
Column 1 focuses on our main measure of job preferences: whether students rank public
administration in the top two of the eight job categories described in Section 3. The
estimated coefficient on the indicator for job preferences is -0.10 and is highly significant,
suggesting that more honest individuals are systematically more likely to prefer a public
service career. In Figure 3 we provide a transparent illustration of this main result by
comparing the average cheat rate between students who rank public administration among
the top two jobs and those who do not. Students ranking public administration in the
19This is relative to a mean of 0.42. The result that many respondents cheat a little bit but not the full
amount is a standard finding in these types of dice games (Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi 2013; Hilbig
and Hessler 2013; Shalvi, Handgraaf, and De Dreu 2011).
20 ̂CheatRatei is equal to individual i’s true cheat rate plus classical measurement error. If we place in
on the left hand side of the regression, we can therefore ignore the fact that we are using the estimated
cheat rate instead of the actual cheat rate. See Section 3 and Section A.1 in the appendix.
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top two cheat 36 percent of the time on average, while other students cheat 46 percent of
the time.
Columns 2 to 5 of Table 2 examine the robustness of the result to using other measures
of job preferences. In Column 2 we replace the indicator variable from Column 1 with the
flipped actual rank given to public administration (so a higher value means a stronger
preference for public service). In Column 3 we use the measured PSM score. In Column 4
we use data from our counterfactual wage question, focusing on whether the student would
choose the public sector over the private sector if faced with a sectoral wage gap of 5,000
DKK (833 USD) per month, corresponding to the typical gap in starting wages between
the two sectors. Finally, in Column 5 we include the students’ reported probability of
entering public administration. Across all these measures we see a negative and highly
significant correlation between cheat rates and expressing a preference for entering public
service. At the end of Section 5 and in the appendix, we show that this result is robust to
a wide range of other checks on the specification.
Next, we examine whether the magnitude of the observed correlation depends on the
exact measure of job preference we use. The bottom row of Table 2 rescales each of
the estimated coefficients so that they reflect the change in cheat rate associated with
a one standard deviation increase in the relevant job preference measure. We see that
the relationship between dishonesty and job preferences is relatively stable across the
different measures. Across all job preference measures, a one standard deviation increase
in preferences for public service is associated with a decrease in the estimated cheat rate
of between 4 and 8 percentage points.
Finally, we can examine whether the observed selection pattern is driven by particularly
strong job preferences among students with a certain level of dishonesty or whether it
reflects differences in job preferences across throughout the distribution of dishonesty. To
answer this question, Sections A.1 and A.2 of the appendix construct estimators for the
entire joint distribution of dishonesty and job preferences. Applying such estimators we
find that the observed selection pattern reflects particularly strong job preferences for
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public service among the very least dishonest students.21
In sum, we find a clear pattern of positive self-selection into public service in Denmark,
as more honest individuals systematically tend to prefer public service jobs. In our baseline
specification find that students ranking public administration among the top two job
options cheat 10 percentage points less than other students. Relative to the mean cheat
rate of 0.42 this represents a 24 percent relative gap in cheat rates.
5 Additional Results: Mechanism and Robustness
In the previous section, we saw that there is systematic self-selection of more honest
individuals into public service in Denmark. Next, we try to shed light on why this selection
pattern exists.
Many different factors could contribute to the observed selection pattern. If more
honest individuals tend to stand out in terms of other attributes or preferences, the
particular job characteristics offered in public service may systematically attract these
individuals. For example, we might imagine that being dishonest is correlated with lower
levels of risk aversion and that people with different risk preferences tend to be attracted
to systematically different types of jobs.
Alternatively, if dishonest individuals are attracted by the opportunity to profit from
corrupt behavior, the currently perceived scope for public sector dishonesty may influence
selection patterns.22 This could imply that negative or positive selection patterns may be
self-reinforcing. It could also imply that the observed selection patterns respond to the
level of monitoring and punishment in the public sector as dishonest individuals opt out
of public service when the opportunities for public sector corruption diminishes.
Given that our survey experiment does not yield any variation in the perceived
corruption level or the level of monitoring and punishment, we are unable to explore the
21Among students who virtually never cheat, 53 percent prefer a public service career. Moving up the
dishonesty distribution, this figure drops rapidly to just under 40 percent among students who cheat
about a third of the time. In the upper part of the distribution (from students who cheat 50 percent of
the time and up), however, the share preferring public service remains fairly constant around 35 percent.
22Corbacho et al. (2016) have shown that such a self-reinforcing effect is present when individuals are
deciding whether to engage in corruption.
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role played by these factors. Since our survey experiment measured a range of additional
attributes, we can however examine whether honest individuals stand out in terms of
other attributes and whether this appears to play a role in shaping job preferences. We
can also examine the role played by public sector wages using the counterfactual wage
questions.
5.1 Correlates of Dishonesty and Job Preferences
We start our investigation by asking whether dishonest individuals and/or individuals
preferring public service careers stand out in terms of other attributes. In doing so, we
focus on four key attributes which ex ante seem likely to correlate both with dishonesty
and job preferences: ability, risk aversion, pro-social vs. pecuniary motivation, and gender.
We again use a simple regression framework to examine the correlation between
dishonesty, job preferences, and these additional attributes. For each attribute, we regress
the individual estimated cheat rate and the indicator for preferring a public service career
on a measure of the attribute in question, Attributei:
̂CheatRatei = γ0 + γ1Attributei + ei
PublicServicei = η0 + η1Attributei + ui
In these regressions, γ1 shows how the attribute correlates with dishonesty, while η1
shows how it correlates with job preferences. Table 3 shows the results. Panel A of the
tables shows the regressions using the estimated cheat rate as the outcome variable, while
Panel B shows the regressions using the indicator for preferring a public service career as
the outcome variable.
Column 1 of the table examines how dishonesty and job preferences correlate with
ability, as measured by GPA. We see no evidence that ability correlates with dishonesty
or job preferences in our data. In both panels, the estimated coefficient on GPA is close
to zero and statistically insignificant.
In Column 2 and 3, we examine risk aversion. In Column 2 we focus on our incentivized
21
risk aversion measure and include an indicator for whether the student chose one of the
two most risky lotteries offered.23 In Column 3 we instead include an indicator for whether
the student ranked job security among the two most important job characteristics. Panel
A shows no statistically significant correlation between dishonesty and either of the two
risk preference measures. In Panel B, there is some indications that risk averse individuals
prefer public service. In Column 2, we see that individuals who chose one of the risky
lotteries are 5.9 percentage points less likely to prefer public service and this difference is
marginally significant (p = 0.09), however the estimated coefficient on valuing job security
in Column 3 points in the opposite direction and is insignificant.24
Columns 4 and 5 look at differences in pro-sociality and pecuniary motivation, as
measured by donations in the dictator game and whether individuals ranked wage among
the two most important job characteristics. These turn out to be strong predictors for
both dishonesty and job preferences. In Column 4, we see that each additional DKK
donated in the dictator game is associated with a 1.6 percentage decrease in the cheat
rate and a 0.9 percentage point increase in the likelihood of preferring public service.25
Conversely, in Column 5, we see that individuals who rank the wage as an important job
characteristics cheat 8.3 percentage points more and are 20 percentage points less likely
to prefer public service. All of these differences are highly statistically significant.
Column 6 looks at gender. We see that men cheat 6.1 percentage points more than
women and are 13 percentage points less likely to prefer public service. Both differences
are statistically significant.
Finally in Column 7 we include all six measures in the regressions simultaneously. In
Panel B, dictator game donation, gender, and the importance of the wage level remain
2350 percent of students in our sample chose one of the two most risky lotteries so the simple indicator
measure summarizes most of the variation in risk aversion in our sample. We get similar results if we use
the risk rank of the chosen lottery, the implied coefficient of relative risk aversion or dummies for each of
the lotteries.
24If risk averse individuals rank job security as important and prefer public service we would expect the
coefficient in Column 3 to show a positive association between preferences for public service and ranking
job security as important.
25The highest possible donation was 15 DKK so the estimates imply that an individual who donates
the maximum amounts cheats 24 percentage points less and is 14 percentage points more likely to prefer
public service than an individual who donates nothing. 33 percent of students choose the maximum
possible donation of 15 DKK, while 40 percent choose to donate nothing.
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statistically significant predictors of job preferences, and the estimates are very similar to
those reported in the previous columns. In Panel A, dictator game donation continues to
show up as a strong predictor of dishonesty, while the coefficient on ranking wage among
the two most important job characteristics drops a bit and becomes only marginally
significant (p = 0.10). The coefficient on gender drops even more, however, and becomes
insignificant. We interpret this as evidence that the relationship between gender and
dishonesty is working mostly through gender differences in pro-sociality and pecuniary
motivation.
5.2 Self-selection Conditional on Attributes
The results in the preceding section suggest that systematic selection of honest individuals
into public service may be related to differences in pro-social vs. pecuniary motivation.
Pro-social individuals who make large donations in the dictator game are systematically
more honest and more likely to prefer a public service career. Conversely, pecuniarily
motivated individuals that rank the wage level as an important job characteristic are
systematically less honest and less likely to prefer a public service career.
These patterns offer an intuitive explanation for the observed selection pattern: As we
return to further below, public sector wages in Denmark tend to be systematically lower
than in the private sector, suggesting that non-pecuniary motivations are important for
entering public service in Denmark. On the other hand, a main motivation for dishonest
behavior is - in our lab experiment as well as in real world settings - that it offers material
gains. This in turn suggests that dishonesty should be more prevalent among pecuniarily
motivated individuals.26
To further explore this explanation we can examine selection into public service
conditional on the different attributes in our data. In particular, we include the different
measures from Table 3 as controls in the regression of estimated cheat rate on job
preferences:
̂CheatRatei = pi0 + pi1PublicServicei + pi2Xi + νi
26Indeed, some studies in personality psychology even find that dishonesty and greediness can be
treated as part of the same fundamental personality trait (see for example Ashton and Lee (2007)).
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In this regression, pi1 captures the relationship between job preferences and dishonesty
after conditioning on the attribute Xi. To the extent that the observed self-selection
of honest individuals into public service is driven by one or more other attributes, the
estimate of pi1 should decrease when the attribute(s) are added as controls.
Table 4 shows the results. Across Columns 1 to 3 we add the different measures for
ability and risk aversion as controls. As would be expected given the results in Table 3,
none of these controls affect the estimated relationship between dishonesty and preferences
for public service. The coefficient on the indicator for ranking public service among the
two most attractive jobs is -0.10 in all three columns. This is the same as in in the
specification without controls in Table 2,
Columns 4 and 5 add the measures of pro-sociality and pecuniary motivation to
the regression. This reduces the estimated coefficient on the indicator for preferring a
public service career. Controlling for donations in the dictator game lowers the estimated
coefficient on job preferences to -0.08, while controlling for whether individuals ranked wage
as an important job characteristic reduces the coefficient to -0.09. As shown at the bottom
of the table these differences in the estimated coefficients are statistically significant.
Column 6 adds gender as a control. This also lowers the estimated coefficient on job
preferences slightly, although this differences is only marginally significant (p = 0.10).
Finally in Column 7, we control for all the different measures simultaneously. After
conditioning on all the measures, the coefficient on job preferences is -0.07. As shown in
Column 8, this change is driven entirely by controlling for dictator game donations and
the indicator for ranking wage as an important job characteristic.27
Overall, we conclude that systematic differences in pro-social vs. pecuniary motivation
can explain a significant part of the observed selection pattern. Conditioning only on our
two simple measures of pro-sociality and pecuniary motivation reduces the cheat rate gap
between students with a preference for public service and other students by 30 percent.28
27In the appendix we reexamine this result using the alternative measures of job preferences in our data.
Across all measures we see that the coefficient on preferences for public service drops when dictator game
donations and the indicator for ranking wage as an important job characteristic are added as controls.
The drop in the coefficient is slightly larger when we use the alternative job preference measures (the
drop is between 32 and 44 percent for these other measures).
28The fact that there is still a significant cheat rate gap after conditioning on these measures is suggestive
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Conversely, none of the other attributes we examine appear important for the observed
selection pattern.
5.3 The Role of Public Sector Wages
Next we focus on the role played by the level of public sector wages in shaping selection
into public service. The results in the preceding sections have interesting implications for
the effect of public sector wages on selection. If dishonest individuals tend to be motivated
by pecuniary incentives while honest individuals tend to be motivated more by pro-social
concerns, we might expect high public sector wages to affect selection by systematically
attracting more dishonest individuals to public service.
Two features of our institutional setting lend support to this idea: First, public sector
wages in Denmark tend to be systematically lower than private sector wages. For the
population we study, entry level wages in the private sector are typically around 5,000
DKK (833 USD) higher per month. This stands in stark contrast to the considerable
public sector wage premiums that are typical in many developing countries struggling
with corruption (Finan, Olken, and Pande 2015). Second, in Section A.3 in the appendix
we analyze the job preferences of dishonest individuals in our sample and document that
dishonest individuals are particularly likely to want a job in the financial sector, which for
our student population stand out as by far the best paid job category. This is indicative
that the positive selection pattern we observe is driven in part by dishonest individuals
being more pecuniarily motivated and self-selecting out of public service jobs and into
higher-paid private sector jobs.29
that other factors also play a role in shaping the observed selection pattern. It could however also reflect
the simplicity of our measures of pro-sociality and pecuniary motivation. Our measures are based on
behavior in a single dictator game and a single question regarding the ranking of job preferences, which
may not perfectly capture all underlying differences in pro-sociality and pecuniary motivation.
29Public sector jobs may stand out from private sector jobs in other dimensions than the wage level.
In the Danish context, another salient difference between public and private sector jobs is that public
sector contracts tend to be more family-friendly. For example, while all parents are entitled to 11 months
parental leave at partial pay, public sector employees typically receive full pay for a larger fraction of
the leave period. Public sector jobs are also traditionally viewed as offering a lower unemployment risk,
although it is somewhat unclear whether this is a salient difference, especially for the population we
study. Formal employment protection is fairly similar between public sector and private sector contracts
in Denmark and our student population already face a very low unemployment risk upon entering the
labor market.
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To provide a more direct test of how public sector wages relate to the observed selection
pattern, we use data from our set of counterfactual wage gap questions. As described
in Section 3, these questions ask students to choose between their preferred private and
public sector jobs conditional on the two jobs having different wage gaps. From the
answers to these questions and the individuals’ estimated cheat rates, we can examine how
changes in the public-private wage gap would affect the selection of honest and dishonest
individuals into public service.
Panel A of Figure 4 shows the results from the counterfactual wage gap questions.
Each pair of lines in the panel correspond to a different hypothetical wage gap scenario,
ranging from the private sector paying 20,000 DKK less per month (3,333 USD) to the
private sector paying 20,000 DKK more. For each wage gap, the height of the lines shows
the average estimated cheat rate among those who would prefer the public and private
sector at the given wage gap.
Furthest to the right, in the scenario where the private sector job pays 20,000 DKK
more, the average estimated cheat rate among students preferring the private sector is
0.43 as opposed to only 0.31 among students preferring the public sector, a gap of 12
percentage points. Moving left to scenarios where the public sector wage is relatively
higher, the average cheat rates in the two groups begin to converge. In the scenario where
the private sector pays 5,000 DKK, roughly the current level of the public-private wage
gap for our student population, the gap in cheat rates is down to 9.0 percentage points.
Moving further left, the pattern continues. As the relative public sector wage is increased,
the average cheat rate increases among public sector candidates and the public-private
gap in dishonesty narrows. It eventually flips in scenarios where the public sector wage is
10,000 DKK or more above the private sector wage.
To understand the quantitative relationship between the private-public wage gap and
the cheat rate gap, Panel B plots the value of the implied private-public cheat rate gap
in the different wage scenarios against the value of the private-public wage gap in of
these each scenarios (error bars show 95 percent confidence intervals for the cheat rate
gaps in each scenario). Mirroring the conclusion from Panel A, we see a clear upward
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sloping relationship between the points in the figure. The solid line in the figure adds
the corresponding regression line. Its slope implies that a relative increase in private
sector wages of 1,000 DKK per month (166 USD) would increase the average gap in cheat
rates between candidates for the private vs public sector by 0.4 percentage points (with a
standard error of 0.1).
Looking at the plot and regression line, we note that the leftmost and rightmost points
in the plot correspond to quite extreme wage scenarios and also involve very imprecisely
estimated cheat rate gaps.30 To check that these are not driving the results, the dotted
line therefore shows how the regression line changes if we exclude these two points. We see
that the line actually becomes slightly steeper; a 1,000 DKK relative increase in private
sector wages is now estimated to increase the gap in cheat rates by 0.6 percentage points
(with a standard error of 0.2).
To the extent that students’ answers in the hypothetical wage scenarios reflect actual
preferences, these results suggest that higher public sector wages would lead to a more
dishonest pool of candidates for public service jobs. This supports the notion that the
relatively low level of public sector wages in Denmark is important for the observed
selection pattern.
5.4 Robustness Checks
We finish this section of the paper by summarizing some additional results and robustness
checks that are presented at length in the appendix.
Our experimental approach to measuring dishonesty has been widely used in the
literature and has been validated to predict fraudulent behavior among public sector
employees by Hanna and Wang (2017). As always however, differences in the exact
experimental implementation may be a concern when comparing results to existing papers
or relying on past validations. In Section A.4 in the appendix we compare the data from
our survey experiment with data from the closely related experiment of Hanna and Wang
30The imprecisely estimated cheat rate gaps in these scenarios reflect that when the wage gap becomes
very large, relatively few students select the lower paying sector. This implies that the average cheat rate
for those preferring the lower paying sector is imprecisely estimated.
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(2017). We see remarkably similar correlations between dishonesty and other inherent
attributes across the two data sets, suggesting that the differences in experimental
implementation do not affect the measurement of dishonesty. This mirrors previous
conclusions in Hilbig and Zettler (2015).31
Another potential concern with our empirical analysis is whether our survey based job
preference measures successfully capture the actual job preferences that students express
upon graduating and entering the labor market. In Section A.5 in the appendix, we
examine this concern using administrative data on actual post-graduation job outcomes
for a subset of our sample. Using the most recent administrative data available to us, we
can examine the 155 students from our sample that had graduated and entered the labor
market by the end of 2017. The job preferences measures from our survey turn out to
be strong (and statistically significant) predictors of actual job outcomes. If we regress
the estimated cheat rate on actual job outcomes as opposed to stated job preference
measures we also get virtually the same estimated coefficient as in our main analysis,
although in the much smaller sample, none of these are statistically significant. Overall,
the administrative data suggest that the job preference measures from our survey capture
actual job preferences well.
In Section A.7 of the appendix, we also conduct a series of robustness checks to shore
up various concerns with our empirical analysis: To address concerns that the many
repetitions in our dice game have made respondents fatigued or otherwise affected their
behavior, we try only using data from different subsets of the dice rolls in our experiment,
including using only the first dice roll for each respondent.32 To asses concerns that
some respondents may be affected by knowledge of the existing academic literature on
dishonesty and its relation to our experimental tasks, we try dropping respondents that
indicate awareness of experimental dishonesty games. To assess concerns that our results
are driven only by extreme cheaters, we try excluding respondents who guess correctly in
31Hilbig and Zettler (2015) compare a survey-based measure of dishonesty with behavior in a range of
different variations of the basic dice-under-cup game, including a dice-guessing similar to the one used
here. They find very similar correlations across all the different implementations of the game.
32Our estimated cheat rate remains an unbiased (although quite noisy) estimate of the true cheat rate
even when we only use data on a single roll for each respondent. As a result, we can still use it to estimate
differences in dishonesty between different groups of respondents (Houser, Vetter, and Winter 2012).
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every round of our dice guessing game. Our results are robust to all the above mentioned
alternative sample restrictions.
Finally, as usual when analyzing survey or experimental data, representativeness and
selective non-participation is a concern. In Section A.9 in the appendix, we examine
issues of non-participation by exploiting that the administrative university data contains
information on enrollment year, field, completed classes, and gender for everyone invited
to our survey experiment. Although our participation rate of 29 percent is reasonably
high, our participant population does differ somewhat from invited non-participants.
Participants are a bit younger, more likely to study economics, and slightly more likely to
be male. Although selection in terms of unobservables can never be ruled out, we apply
reweighing procedures that correct non-participation and find no evidence that selective
non-response affects our results.
6 Conclusion
We study the role of self-selection into public service in sustaining an equilibrium of
low corruption and low public sector dishonesty. Focusing on the world’s least corrupt
country, Denmark, we conduct a survey experiment among a relevant student population
to obtain individual measures of dishonesty, preferences for entering public service, and
other relevant attributes.
We document extensive heterogeneity in dishonesty among potential candidates for
public service and a clear pattern of positive self-selection: Students expressing a preference
for entering public service cheat 10 percentage point less in a standard experimental
dishonesty task. This result stands in sharp contrast to previous results from more corrupt
countries.
To shed some light on the mechanisms behind the observed selection pattern, we
examine whether dishonesty and job preferences correlate systematically with other
attributes. Differences in pro-social vs. pecuniary motivation turn out to be strong
predictors of both dishonesty and job preferences. Pro-socially motivated students who
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make large donations in a dictator game are systematically more honest and more likely
to prefer a public service career. On the other hand, pecuniarily motivated students that
rank the wage level as an important job characteristic are systematically less honest and
less likely to express a preference for a public service career. We find that this pattern can
explain a significant part of the association between honesty and preferences for public
service.
Finally, we examine the role of public sector wages in shaping the observed selection
pattern based on a set of counterfactual job preference question that vary the wage gap
between the public and private sector. Consistent with the results regarding pro-social
vs. pecuniary motivation, we find that higher public sector wages would attract more
dishonest candidates to public service in Denmark.
Overall, our results confirm that systematic selection of honest individuals into public
service may be part of the reason that Denmark is able to maintain its low levels of
corruption and public sector dishonesty. To the extent that current levels of public sector
dishonesty affect the future career choices of honest and dishonest individuals, this suggests
that Denmark may be benefitting from a virtuous cycle where low levels of corruption
and the self-selection of honest individuals into public service are mutually reinforcing.
Such virtuous cycles can explain why some countries are consistently able to sustain an
honest public sector, while many other countries struggle with high levels of corruption.
At the same time however, our results regarding public sector wages suggest that
it is possible to change the observed selection pattern by changing policy. In fact, our
results suggest that that the standard policy recommendation of combatting corruption
by increasing public sector wages may have unintended negative effects on selection. The
implication of this is not that countries struggling with high levels of corruption should
simply start lowering public sector wages; the effect of changes in public sector wages is
not necessarily the same across high and low corruption settings, and high public sector
wages may still have large beneficial effects on the incentives for corruption if they raise
the cost of being fired for corruption or if they are necessary to keep public employees’
incomes above subsistence levels. At the same time, however, our results do suggest that
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high public sector wages is not the reason Denmark has been and continues to be among
the world’s least corrupt countries. Understanding the factors and policy choices that
affect selection into public service should thus be a key objective for future research.
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Figure 1: Corruption across countries 1996-2014
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The figure shows the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) 1996-2014 for all available countries. The
highlighted red line is Denmark, while the grey lines show the series for other countries.
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Figure 2: Distribution of correct guesses and predicted distribution under full honesty
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The histogram shows the observed number of correct guesses across students in our dice
experiment (solid bars) and the predicted distribution under full honesty (outlined bars).
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Figure 3: Mean estimated cheat rates by ranking of public administration
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(left) and individuals ranking public administration lower (right). The difference between the
groups corresponds to the coefficient in Column 1 of Table 2. Error bars represent 95 pct.
confidence intervals.
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Figure 4: The private-public wage gap and the private-public dishonesty gap
Panel A: Average cheat rate for those preferring public and private sector in each wage scenario
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Panel B: Private-public difference in average cheat rate by size of private-public wage gap
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Panel A shows the averages estimated cheat rate among students preferring public and private sector
in different counterfactual wage scenarios that vary the private sector wage premium. Each pair of
one black and one grey line correspond to a different wage scenario. Black lines show the estimated
cheat rates of those choosing the private sector sector in the wage scenario. Grey lines shows the
estimated cheat rates for those choosing the public sector. Panel shows plots differences in estimated
cheat rates between students preferring private and public sector against the public private wage
gap. Error bars show 95 pct. confidence intervals. The dashed vertical line shows the approximate
current private sector wage premium of +5,000 DKK.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Number of correct guesses 862 20.724 13.186 0 40
Estimated cheat rates 862 0.422 0.396 −0.200 1
Public administation rank ≤ 2 862 0.422 0.494 0 1
Higher ranking of public administration 862 −3.414 2.079 −8 −1
Public service motivation score 860 2.440 0.521 0.250 3.950
Public sector picked at current wage 862 0.281 0.450 0 1
Probability of public administration 858 0.207 0.130 0 0.900
GPA (standardized) 861 −0.002 0.998 −5.914 2.332
Picks risky lottery 862 0.501 0.500 0 1
Job security rank ≤ 2 862 0.119 0.325 0 1
Donation 862 6.798 6.521 0 15
Wage rank ≤ 2 862 0.288 0.453 0 1
Male 862 0.536 0.499 0 1
The table shows summary statistics for the participants in the survey experiment.
The variables are the number of reported correct guesses across the 40 dice games,
the estimated cheat rate, an indicator for whether public administration was
ranked in the top two of the eight job categories, the flipped actual rank given
to public administration (so that a higher value means a stronger preference
for public administration), the public service motivation score, an indicator
for whether the public sector was picked in the wage scenario corresponding
to the current wage gap, the subjective probability of ending up in public
administration, GPA standardized by field (the non-zero mean is due to the
one excluded participant), an indicator for choosing one of the two most risky
lotteries, the amount donated in the dictator game, the student’s gender and
indicators for whether job security and wage was ranked in the top two of the
five job characteristics
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Table 2: Dishonesty and public service job preferences
Estimated cheat rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Public administation rank ≤ 2 −0.102∗∗
(0.027)
Higher ranking of public administration −0.022∗∗
(0.006)
Public service motivation score −0.152∗∗
(0.026)
Public sector picked at current wage −0.090∗∗
(0.029)
Probability of public administration −0.285∗∗
(0.105)
Constant 0.465∗∗ 0.345∗∗ 0.793∗∗ 0.447∗∗ 0.481∗∗
(0.018) (0.025) (0.066) (0.016) (0.026)
N 862 862 860 862 858
R2 0.016 0.014 0.040 0.010 0.009
Implied change in cheat rate
following a one std. dev. −0.050∗∗ −0.047∗∗ −0.079∗∗ −0.040∗∗ −0.037∗∗
increase in preferences for (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014)
public service:
The table shows regressions of students’ estimated cheat rates on various measures of public
service job preferences. The job preference measures are an indicator for whether public
administration was ranked in the top two of the eight job categories, the flipped actual rank
given to public administration (so that a higher value means a stronger preference for public
administration), the public service motivation score, an indicator for whether the public sector
was picked in the wage scenario corresponding to the current wage gap and the subjective
probability of ending up in public administration. The last row of the table rescales the estimated
coefficients on the different job preferences measures so they reflect the implied change in cheat
rates when the preference for public service is increased by one standard deviation. Robust
standard errors in parenthesis. ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01.
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Table 3: Correlates of dishonesty and job preferences
Panel A:
Estimated cheat rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
GPA (standardized) 0.007 0.014
(0.014) (0.014)
Picks risky lottery 0.035 0.036
(0.027) (0.027)
Job security rank ≤ 2 0.002 −0.002
(0.039) (0.038)
Donation −0.016∗∗ −0.016∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
Wage rank ≤ 2 0.083∗∗ 0.048
(0.029) (0.029)
Male 0.061∗ 0.034
(0.027) (0.027)
Constant 0.422∗∗ 0.404∗∗ 0.422∗∗ 0.533∗∗ 0.398∗∗ 0.389∗∗ 0.481∗∗
(0.013) (0.019) (0.014) (0.019) (0.016) (0.019) (0.028)
R2 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.073 0.009 0.006 0.082
Panel B:
Public administation rank ≤ 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
GPA (standardized) 0.001 −0.002
(0.017) (0.017)
Picks risky lottery −0.058 −0.042
(0.034) (0.034)
Job security rank ≤ 2 −0.072 −0.093
(0.051) (0.049)
Donation 0.009∗∗ 0.006∗
(0.003) (0.003)
Wage rank ≤ 2 −0.202∗∗ −0.184∗∗
(0.035) (0.036)
Male −0.126∗∗ −0.092∗∗
(0.034) (0.035)
Constant 0.423∗∗ 0.451∗∗ 0.431∗∗ 0.364∗∗ 0.480∗∗ 0.490∗∗ 0.513∗∗
(0.017) (0.024) (0.018) (0.024) (0.020) (0.025) (0.036)
R2 0.000 0.003 0.002 0.013 0.034 0.016 0.058
N 861 862 862 862 862 862 861
Panel A of the table shows regressions of students’ estimated cheat rates on various measures
of other student attributes. Panel B of the table shows the same regressions but replacing the
outcome variable with an indicator for whether students ranked public administration in the
top two of the eight job categories. The measures of other attributes are GPA standardized
by field, an indicator for choosing the one of the two most risky lotteries, the amount donated
in the dictator game, an indicator for being male and indicators for whether job security and
wage was ranked in the top two of the five job characteristics. Robust standard errors in
parenthesis. ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01.
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A Appendix (FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION)
A.1 Econometric Details
This section presents additional details and discussion regarding the econometric methods
we apply to the data from our experimental dice game. In subsection A.1.1 we present a
longer derivation of the estimated individual cheat rates that we use throughout the main
analysis and in subsection A.1.2 we discuss how we use these estimates to examine the
relationship between dishonesty, job preferences and other characteristics. In subsection
A.1.3, we further characterize the measurement error in the estimated cheat rates. The
remaining subsections focus on how to identify and estimate the full distribution of
dishonesty. Subsection A.1.4 discusses identification of the cheat rate distribution, while
subsection A.1.5 derives the specific Maximum Likelihood estimator we use to examine
the distribution. Finally, subsection A.1.6 derives an estimator that jointly estimates the
distribution of dishonesty and job preferences.
We use the same setup and notation as in the main text but repeat it here for
convenience: The data contain information on a random sample of N respondents indexed
by i. For each respondent we observe whether they report a win in each of the K different
rounds of the dice game, which we index by k. We let yik be an indicator variable for
whether respondent i reported winning in round k and let Yi =
∑K
k=1 yik denote the total
number of reported wins. The probability of winning truthfully is independent across
rounds equal to p∗, however, individuals may cheat and report a win regardless of the
actual outcome. Individual i dishonestly reports a win some fraction θi ∈ [0, 1] of the time
and reports the truth otherwise. We refer to θi as individual i’s cheat rate.
For the purpose of this appendix, we also introduce some additional notation: We
let F denote the distribution of cheat rates in the population, θi ∼ F . We let ψi denote
individual i’s expected share of reported wins across multiple rounds of the dice game,
ψi = E
(
Yi
K
|θi
)
and let G denote the distribution of ψi in the population of interest, ψi ∼ G.
Finally, we let Xi denote some characteristic of individual i that is observed in the data
(typically an indicator for whether individual i prefers a public service career).
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A.1.1 Estimating Individual Dishonesty
We start by providing a more detailed derivation of the estimator of individual cheat rates
that serves as our measure of dishonesty throughout the main analysis. The starting point
is to note that in a given round, a respondent will win truthfully and report a win with
probability p∗, or, if he does not win truthfully, he will dishonestly report a win with
probability θi. Accordingly, the probability of observing a win for individual i, conditional
on his cheat rate is:
P
(
yik = 1
∣∣∣θi) = p∗ + (1− p∗)θi
Since of course P
(
yik = 1
∣∣∣θi) = E (yik∣∣∣θi), we can rearrange the above to get:
θi =
1
1− p∗E
(
yik
∣∣∣θi)− p∗1− p∗
Replacing the expectation E
(
yik
∣∣∣θi) by the corresponding population moment 1KYi
then yields the method of moments estimator (denoted ̂CheatRatei in the main text):
θˆi =
1
1− p∗
1
K
Yi − p
∗
1− p∗
We make two remarks regarding this estimator here:
First, it is straightforward to check that the estimator is unbiased:
E
(
θˆi|θi
)
= 11− p∗
1
K
K∑
k=1
E
(
yik
∣∣∣θi)− p∗1− p∗ = θi
Second, it is worth noting that the estimated cheat rate, θˆi, will be negative for any
respondent who reports winning fewer than K p∗1−p∗ times, in spite of the fact that in fact
θi ≥ 0 by assumption. It is possible to define different estimators that are non-negative,
however, these estimator will generally not be unbiased. As we shall see in the next
section, unbiasedness is particularly important given the analysis we conduct.
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A.1.2 The Relationship between Dishonesty and Characteristics
The main aim of the paper is to estimate the relationship between dishonesty and job
preferences or between dishonesty and other respondent characteristics. In this section,
we discuss how this can be done in a regression framework using the individual estimated
cheat rates from the previous section. For ease of exposition, we will frame the discussion
specifically in terms of estimating the relationship between dishonesty and job preferences.
Accordingly, in the rest of the section we will assume that Xi is some measure of individual
i’s preferences for public service, however, all the arguments go through if Xi is instead
assumed to be some other characteristic of interest.
Throughout our analysis, we summarize the relationship between dishonesty and job
preferences in the following linear regression:1
θi = β0 + β1Xi + εi (1)
The object of interest here is the parameter β1, which captures the relationship between
individual i’s cheat rate, θi and their job preferences, Xi. In the particular case where Xi
is an indicator for whether i prefers a public service career, β1 is just the difference in the
mean cheat rate between individuals preferring a public service career and individuals
preferring the private sector.
We can not directly estimate the regression above because we do not observe each
individual’s true cheat rate, θi. As discussed in the previous section, however, the data
from the dice game allow us to construct an estimated cheat rate, θˆi, for each individual. As
always, we can view this estimate as being equal to the true cheat rate plus a measurement
error term ξi that is simply defined as ξi ≡ θˆ − θi:
θˆi = θi + ξi
1More formally, we let β0 and β1 be defined in the usual (implicit) way by imposing E(εi) = 0 and
Cov(Xi, εi) = 0 in (1).
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Now, because θˆi is unbiased for θi and because the measurement error in θˆi stems
solely from randomness in whether individuals’ win truthfully or cheat in any specific
round of the dice game, it follows that the measurement error ξi has mean zero and is
mean independent of both θi and Xi:2
E (ξi|θi, Xi) = 0
It follows that the measurement error ξi is classical.3 As usual, we can therefore obtain
a consistent estimate of our parameter of interest from a regression that uses the estimated
cheat rate instead of the true cheat rate. Substituting θi = θˆi − ξi in (1) and rearranging
we get:
θˆi = β0 + β1Xi + (εi − ξi) (2)
Because the measurement error is classical (in particular because Cov(Xi, ξi) = 0),
OLS estimation of (2) will yield a consistent estimator for β1 under the usual conditions.
In other words, using the estimated cheat rate as the outcome variable instead of the true
cheat rate does not affect the consistency of our estimates.
Note that the same is not true if we consider the reverse regression and instead regress
of Xi on the estimated cheat rate θˆi. In this case our estimates will suffer from the usual
attenuation bias. Accordingly, in our main analysis, we always focus on regressions that
use the (estimated) cheat rate as the dependent variable.
2Regardless of Xi, individual i’s probability of winning truthfully in our dice game is p∗ and his or her
probability of being dishonest is θi. The conditional probability of reporting a win in the dice game is
therefore E (yik|θi, Xi) = p∗ + (1− p∗)θi. The same derivation that showed unbiasedness in Section A.1.1
therefore shows that E
(
θˆi|θi, Xi
)
= θi, which further implies E (ξi|θi, Xi) = 0.
3The term “classical measurement error” is sometimes used to mean slightly differently things. Here
we use it to refer to a situation in which the measurement error is uncorrelated with the true value and
also uncorrelated with any other potential regressors.
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A.1.3 The Degree of Measurement Error
The previous section showed that the measurement error in the individual estimated cheat
rates do not affect the consistency of our estimates. Because the measurement error, ξi
is absorbed into the composite error term in (2), however, the measurement error does
increase the variance of the error term, which lowers precision and power. It is therefore
of interest to examine the extent of the measurement error.
We can examine the measurement error in our estimated cheat rate by examining the
variance of the estimator. To do this we have to take a stronger stance on the dependence
of cheating behavior across rounds of the dice game. We focus here on the case where
cheating behavior is independent across time for a given individual.4 In this case, for an
individual with cheat rate θi, the total number of reported wins, Yi, is simply the number
of successes in K independent trials with success probability p∗ + (1− p∗)θi. Conditional
on θi, Yi therefore follows a binomial distribution:
Yi|θi ∼ B(K, p∗ + (1− p∗)θi) (3)
Recall that our estimated cheat rate for each individual is θˆi = 11−p∗
1
K
Yi − p∗1−p∗ .
Applying the standard formula for the variance of a binomially distributed random
variable along with some simple algebra then yields the following expression for the
variance of the estimated individual cheat rate (and thus for the extent of measurement
error):
V ar
(
θˆi
∣∣∣θi) = V ar (ξi∣∣∣θi) = θi(1− θi)
K
+ p
∗
(1− p∗)
(1− θi)
K
From the above expression we see that the measurement error in our measure of
dishonesty is increasing in p∗ and decreasing in K. This motivates the design of our
dice game which has a relatively low win probability, p∗ = 16 and asks respondents to
repeat the dice game many times over, K = 40 (as we shall see in the next section, asking
4It is conceptually straightforward to do similar derivations when dishonesty exhibits time dependence,
however, it requires that one is willing to specify the exact form of time dependence.
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respondents to repeat the dice game offers additional advantages if one wants to estimate
the full distribution of dishonesty).
A.1.4 Identification of the Full Distribution of Dishonesty
In the preceding sections we showed how to examine whether dishonest differs across
individuals with different observables Xi. Next, we turn to the more basic question of
examining how much dishonesty differs across the population overall. Accordingly, in this
section, we consider how to estimate the full distribution of cheat rates in the population,
F . As in the preceding section, this requires that we take a stronger stance on the time
dependence of cheating behavior so from now on we maintain the assumption that cheating
behavior is independent across time for a given individual.5
We start our discussion by focusing solely on identification, that is we ask what can
be identified if we had experimental data on all individuals in the population of interest
rather than just our specific sample of respondents. It turns out that the answer to this
question depends crucially on how many times respondent repeat the dice game in the
experiment, K. At one extreme, if each respondents only plays one round of the dice game,
the data is completely uninformative about the extent of heterogeneity in dishonesty:
When K = 1 it can be shown that any observed outcome of the experiment is consistent
with a “no heterogeneity” scenario in which all indviduals have the same cheat rate.6
At the other extreme, we might consider what happens when the number of repetitions
in the dice game becomes very large. When the number of rounds in the dice game grows
to infinity, the share of observed wins reported for individual i converges to to the expected
share of wins for this individual, Yi
K
p→ ψi when K →∞. In this case, the experimenter is
therefore able to observe the distribution of expected share of wins across individuals, G.
It is easy to show that this non-parametrically identifies the full distribution of dishonesty,
5Again, if one is willing to specify the exact form of time dependence in cheating, it is conceptually
straightforward to adapt the results and estimators we present here to a situation with time dependence.
6When each respondent only participates in one round of the dice game, the data observed by the
experimenter is just the number of individuals reporting a correct and an incorrect guess, which is
equivalent to observing just the share of participants who report a correct guess in their roll, P (yi1 = 1).
Now let x be some observed value of P (yi1 = 1). If all individuals are assumed to have a cheat rate of
θ¯ = 11−p∗x− p
∗
1−p∗ , this exactly implies P (yi1 = 1) = p∗ + (1− p∗)θ¯ = x.
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F .7
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the empirically relevant case where K is large but finite turns
out to fall between these two extremes. In this case, the experimental data is informative
about the extent of heterogeneity in dishonesty but the full distribution of dishonesty
is not in general non-parametrically identified. To build an understanding of why this
is the case, note that when respondents play K rounds of the dice game, the outcome
variable observed in the experiment, Yi, takes on K + 1 possible values (0 reported wins,
1 reported win, . . . , K reported wins) for each individual. Accordingly, it can be shown
that the informativeness of the experimental data regarding the distribution of cheat rates,
F , can be summarized by K + 1 moment conditions.8
While the moment conditions are generally very informative about the shape of F ,
K+1 equations will not generally be enough to non-parametrically identify a distribution.9
Given that the full distribution of cheat rates is not non-parametrically identified, the
next section proceeds by developing a parametric estimator for F .10 As we shall see in
Section A.2, our overall conclusions regarding F are robust to using different flexible
parametric families for F , suggesting that the data is in fact highly informative about the
7ηi = E (yik = 1|θi) = p∗ + (1 − p∗)θi so ηi is a linear transformation of θi. Knowledge of the
distribution of ηi, therefore also pins down the distribution of θi.
8 Formally, when cheating behavior is assumed independent over time, Yi summarizes all the infor-
mation the data contains about F . Moreover, because Yi is a binomial random variable conditional
on θi in this case, the conditional probability of observing x reported wins is just P (Yi = x|θi) =(
K
x
)
(p∗ + (1− p∗)θi)x (1− p∗ + (1− p∗)θi)K−x for all x = 0, 1, ...K. Integrating over the distribution of
cheat rates yields the unconditional probability of observing x wins and so that we arrive at the following
K + 1 moment conditions:
P (Yi = x) =
∫ 1
0
rK,x(θ) dF (θ) for x = 0, 1, ...,K
rK,x(θi) ≡
(
K
x
)
(p∗ + (1− p∗)θi)x (1− p∗ + (1− p∗)θi)K−x
9To see how the moment conditions are informative about F , note that the functions rK,x involved in
the moment conditions (see footnote 8) are all positive, single-peaked and have their peaks located in
different areas along [0, 1] As each of the moment conditions correspond to an integral over one of these
functions, each moment conditions therefore provide information on how much mass the distribution F
puts in a particular region of [0, 1]. At the same time, if two candidate distributions F ′ and F ∗ give rise
to the same value of the K + 1 integrals involved in the moment conditions, the experimental data will
not allow us to distinguish which one of them (if any) is the true distribution of dishonesty.
10We do not have a general identification result for the specific parametric families we consider. Across
all our simulations and estimations on both the actual experimental data and various bootstrap samples,
however, the distribution F has been identified within the parametric families we use.
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distribution.
A.1.5 Estimation of the Full Distribution of Dishonesty
We now turn to the construction of an estimator for the full distribution of dishonesty, F .
As discussed in the previous section, we start by restricting F to belong to some flexible
parametric family of distributions on [0, 1], parameterized by a vector λ ∈ Rv.11
Once F is assumed to belong to some parametric family, we can develop a Maximum
Likelihood estimator for F . When cheating behavior is independendent over time, the
number of reported wins conditional on θi is a binomial random variable. The probability
of Yi reported wins is therefore
(
K
Yi
)
(p∗ + (1− p∗)θi)Yi (1− p∗ + (1− p∗)θi)K−Yi . We
can then integrate out θi to get the unconditional probability of observing Yi correct guesses:
∫ 1
0
(
K
Yi
)
(p∗ + (1− p∗)θ)Yi (1− p∗ + (1− p∗)θ)K−Yi dF (θ;λ)
Given a sample of individuals with Y1, Y2, ..., YN the log likelihood function is then:
logL(λ) =
N∑
i=1
log
(∫ 1
0
(
K
Yi
)
(p∗ + (1− p∗)θ)Yi (1− p∗ + (1− p∗)θ)K−Yi dF (θ;λ)
)
Maximization of the log likelihood function with respect to the parameter vector
λ yields the Maximum Likelihood estimator for F . In Section A.2 we implement this
estimator on our experimental data.
A.1.6 Joint Estimation of the Distribution of Dishonesty and Job Prefer-
ences
Over the preceding sections we first considered how to estimate the relationship between
cheat rates and job preferences (or other characteristics) under minimal assumptions and
then focused on how to estimate the distribution of dishonesty by invoking additional
assumptions on the time dependence of cheating behavior. If one is willing to impose these
additional assumptions throughout, however, it is possible to combine the two estimation
11We discuss the specific choice of parametric family in Section A.2.1.
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problems and jointly estimate the distribution of both dishonesty and job preferences. We
finish our section on econometric details by extending the Maximum Likelihood estimator
from the previous section to this case.
In the rest of this section, we will treat Xi as an indicator for whether individual
i prefers a public service careeer. In addition, we let m(θi) denote the conditional
probability that some individual i prefers a public service career, conditional on his cheat
rate: P (Xi = 1|θi) = m(θi). To estimate the joint distribution of dishonesty and job
preferences, we will construct a joint estimator of F and m.12
We maintain the same parametric assumption on F as in the previous section, so that
estimation of F (·;λ) is again equivalent to estimation of λ. Our approach to estimating
m will depend on whether F is assumed to be discrete. When F is discrete and the
population consists of a finite number of types, each with a fixed cheat rate, we take a
fully non-parametric approach and estimate a different probability of preferring a public
service career for each of the types. When F is continuous (possibly including one or
more masspoints), this non-parametric approach is not feasible and we instead impose a
functional form on m. A convenient notation that covers both cases is to write m as a
function of both the cheat rate θ and a real-valued vector ζ ∈ Rq, so that estimation of m
is simply equivalent to estimation of ζ:13
P (Xi = 1|θi) = m(θ; ζ)
Next, to derive the likelihood function, we note that conditional on the cheat rate, θi,
the probability of observing an individual with Yi reported wins in the dice game and a
preference for public service Xi is just :
12Joint knowledge of both of these of course permits one to compute the joint distribution of the
variables θi and Xi as well as any corresponding conditional or marginal distribution.
13When F is discrete, each elements of ζ will be the probability of preferring a public service career for
one of the discrete types in the population. When F is continuous, the elements of ζ will instead be the
parameters of the functional form imposed on m. In both cases, estimation of m is simply equivalent to
estimation of ζ.
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((
K
Yi
)
(p∗ + (1− p∗)θi)Yi (1− p∗ + (1− p∗)θi)K−Yi
)
·
(
m(θ; ζ)Xi (1−m(θ; ζ))1−Xi
)
As before, we can then integrate out θi to arrive at the corresponding unconditional
probability:
∫ 1
0
((
K
Yi
)
(p∗ + (1− p∗)θi)Yi (1− p∗ + (1− p∗)θi)K−Yi
)
·
(
m(θ; ζ)Xi (1−m(θ; ζ))1−Xi
)
dF (θ;λ)
Given a sample of individuals with (Y1, X1), (Y2, X2), ..., (YN , XN ) we get the following
log likelihood function:
logL(λ, ζ) =
N∑
i=1
log
∫ 1
0
((
K
Yi
)
(p∗ + (1− p∗)θi)Yi (1− p∗ + (1− p∗)θi)K−Yi
)
·
(
m(θ; ζ)Xi (1−m(θ; ζ))1−Xi
)
dF (θ;λ)

Maximization of the log likelihood function with respect to λ and ζ yields the joint
Maximum Likelihood estimator for F andm. In Section A.2.5 we implement this estimator
on our experimental data.
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A.2 The Distribution of Dishonesty, Results
In this section we present estimates of the full distribution of cheat rates in our student
population using the Maximum Likelihood estimators discussed in the previous sections.
Since the estimators requires imposing a parametric assumption on he distribution of the
cheat rate, F , we start by discussing the choice of parametric family and then present and
compare the estimated distribution under different parametric assumptions. We finish
by showing joint estimates of the distribution of cheat rates and the distribution of job
preferences.
A.2.1 The Choice of Parametric Model
In deciding on a parametric familiy for the distribution of cheat rates, the first choice we
need to make is whether to model the distribution as continuous or discrete. Since there
are pros and cons to both approaches we consider and compare both approaches here.
In Section A.2.2 we show results using a continuous parametric family for the distribu-
tion of cheat rates. Given that the number of wins is distributed quite smoothly between
0 and 40 in our data, a continuous distribution of cheat rates is likely to give a good
fit using only relatively few parameters. When modelling the distribution of cheat rates
as continuous, we primarily use a mixture of Beta distributions. This makes up a very
flexible class of distributions on [0, 1]. In particular, the Beta distribution can both allow
for most of the mass being concentrated in the interior of [0, 1] or at one or both of the
end points. This allows us to capture that there may be significant share of individuals
who are almost always honest and/or almost always dishonest, without imposing that
this is necessarily the case.
A potentially unattractive feature of assuming a continuous distribution for F , is that
by construction it will put zero mass on any indvidual point, including the two endpoints,
0 and 1. This implies that the share of completely honest and dishonest individuals
in the population will always equal 0. To examine the prevalence of “extreme” types,
however, we instead examine what fraction of individuals are practically completely honest
or dishonest defined as cheating less than 2 percent or more than 98 percent of the time.
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In Section A.2.2 we instead model the distribution of cheat rates as a discrete distribu-
tion. This is equivalent to assuming that the population consists of some finite number of
types, each of which have a different cheat rate. While a relatively large number of types
is likely necessary to fit the smooth distribution of cheat rates in our data, results using a
discrete distribution can be easier to interpret in some cases. Many theoretical models
of dishonesty use a discrete type spaces so estimates from a discrete distribution can
provide a more natural link to theory. Moreover, discrete distributions allow for a strictly
positive share of individuals to have cheat rates of exactly 0 or 1. Finally, specifying and
estimating the conditional distribution of job preferences conditional on a given cheat
rate is also particularly straightforward when the cheat rates distribution is discrete, as
one can simply estimate a separate probability of preferring public service for each of the
types.
A.2.2 Results Using a Continuous Distribution
In Table 5 we present estimates of the distribution of cheat rates when modelling the
distribution (primarily) as continous. We present results using three different models for
the distribution. Model (1) is our preferred model. It parameterizes the distribution of
cheat rates as a mixture of two Beta distributions with parameters and weights to be
estimated. Parameterizing the Beta-distributions in terms of mean and variance, the
first column in the table show the estimated parameters and weights for each of the two
components in the mixture. The corresponding estimated distribution of cheat rates
is shown in Figure 5. We see extensive heterogeneity in dishonesty: 14.0 percent of
individuals are estimated to be practically completely honest and cheat less than 2 percent
of the time, while 17.0 percent are practically completely dishonest and cheat more than
98 percent of the time.14 The standard deviation of the distribution is 0.39.
The rest of Table 5 presents results using alternative parametric forms for the dis-
tribution. Model (2) in the table extends Model (1) by including an additional Beta
14The standard error on the estimated share of the distribution that is practically completely honest is
2.0 percentage points. The standard error on the estimated share of the distribution that is practically
completely dishonest is 1.4 percentage points.
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Figure 5: Estimated distribution of dishonesty using a continuous distribution
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The figure shows the estimated probability density function for the distribution of cheat rates
across students, based on a two component Beta-mixture. Dashed lines show pointwise 95
percent confidence intervals obtained via bootstrapping. Note that the y-axis is truncated;
the function goes to infinity at the endpoints.
distribution in the mixture. The extra Beta distribution is estimated to have a weight of
about 0.05, a mean of about 0.33 and a variance that is very close to zero. In practice this
third estimated Beta-distribution in the mixture is thus indistinguishable from a discrete
distribution with all its mass at 0.33. This motivates Model (3) in the table which instead
extends Model (1) by including a mass point in addition to the continuous two component
Beta-mixture. Similar to the results in Model (2), the included mass point is estimated to
have a mass of about 0.05 and be located at 0.33.
Comparing the fit of the three models, the practical similarity of models (2) and (3) is
evidenced by the fact that they both yield a log likelihood of -2813, whereas model (1)
yields a slightly worse log likelihood of -2814. Since models (2) and (3) also include more
free parameters, however, model selection based on standard information criteria (IC)
suggests that Model (1) is preferred as it has a strictly smaller Bayesian IC and Akaike
IC than both Model (2) and (3). Conducting Likelihood Ratio tests of Model (1) against
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Figure 6: Actual vs predicted distribution of reported wins using a continuous distribution
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The histogram shows the observed number of correct guesses in the data as well as the predicted
distribution based on the estimated distribution of cheat rates using a two component Beta-
mixture (Model (1) of Table 5).
Model (2) and Model (3), we also cannot reject Model (1) at any conventional level of
significance (p = 0.15 and p = 0.18 respectively).15
Finally, Figure 6 provides a different check on the fit of Model (1) by plotting the
predicted distribution of correct guesses under the estimated distribution against the
actually observed distribution of correct guesses. As the figure shows, the estimated
distribution does a very good job of fitting the observed distribution.
A.2.3 Results Using a Discrete Distribution
In Table 6 we present estimates of the distribution of cheat rates, when modelling the
distribution as discrete. Again we present results using three different models. Model
(1) assumes that the population consists of six discrete types: a fully honest type with a
15 Testing Model (1) against the other models implies testing whether one of the components in a
mixture has zero weight. This is a non-standard testing problem. We therefore base the likelihood ratio
test on McLachlan (1987)’s parametric bootstrap procedure for mixture distributions.
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Table 5: Distribution of cheat rates, continuous distribution, detailed estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Beta-mixture component I:
Weight 0.275 0.274 0.288
(0.058) (0.063) (0.037)
Mean 0.975 0.975 0.975
(0.052) (0.038) (0.018)
Variance 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.018) (0.015) (0.006)
Beta-mixture component II:
Weight 0.725 0.672 0.712
(0.058) (0.060) (0.037)
Mean 0.214 0.205 0.205
(0.018) (0.056) (0.038)
Variance 0.049 0.052 0.052
(0.008) (0.021) (0.012)
Beta-mixture component III:
Weight - 0.054 -
(0.069)
Mean - 0.331 -
(0.054)
Variance - <0.001 -
Additional mass point:
Mass at point - - 0.052
(0.057)
Mass point location - - 0.334
(0.152)
Log likelihood -2814 -2813 -2813
Akaike IC 5638 5644 5640
Bayesian IC 5662 5687 5673
p-value, LR-test, H0 : Model (1) - 0.149 0.178
The table shows maximum likelihood estimates for the distribution of cheat rates
based on three different model specifications. Model (1) specifies the distribution to
be a two-component beta-mixture. Model (2) specifies the distribution to be a three-
component beta-mixture. Model (3) specifies the distribution to be mixture between
a two-component beta-mixture and a mass point. For each model the estimated
parameters and mixture weights are shown along with resulting Log Likelihood and
Information criteria (IC). Bootstrapped standard errors are in parenthesis. The last
row shows p-values of likelihood ratio tests, based on the parametric bootstrap of
McLachlan (1987).
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cheat rate of 0, a fully dishonest type with a cheat rate of 1, and four intermediate types
with cheat rates strictly between 0 and 1 that are to be estimated from the data. The
first column of the table shows the estimated population shares for each of the six types
as well as the estimated cheat rates for each of the four intermediate types under Model
(1). The second and third column of Table 5 shows corresponding results from alternative
Models (2) and (3). These extend Model (1) by allowing for five or six intermediate types
instead of only four.
Comparing the columns, we note initially that the three different models give rise
to virtually indistinguishable estimated population shares and cheat rates for the fully
honest type, as well as for the first two or three intermediate type. For the fully dishonest
type and towards the top of the cheat rate distribution, the introduction of additional
intermediate types changes estimates more however.
To asses which of the three model should be preferred, the bottom of the table presents
various measures of fit. We see straight away that Model (2) dominates Model (1). Looking
at standard model selection criteria, Model (2) has both a smaller Akaike IC and Bayesian
IC than Model (1). In addition, a likelihood ratio test strongly rejects Model (1) against
Model (2) (p < 0.01).16
The comparison of Model (2) and (3), however, is more complicated. The Akaike IC
suggest that Model (1) is the preferred model, however the two Models give a similar
value of the Bayesian IC. In addition, a likelihood ratio test of Model (2) against Model
(3) rejects at the 5 percent level (p = 0.037), suggesting Model (3) as the preferred model.
In Panels A and B of Figure 7 we examine the estimated distribution of cheat rates
under Models (2) and (3). Despite differences in the exact location and population shares
for the more dishonest types, we note that the overall features of the two distributions
are in fact very similar. In particular, the standard deviation of cheat rates is 0.39 under
both distributions and the estimated share of fully honest individuals is 17.1 and 16.6 and
percent respectively.
Focusing on the fully dishonest individuals, the two estimated distributions differs
16Again we use the parametric bootstrap of McLachlan (1987) to deal with the fact that this is a
non-standard testing problem. See footnote 15.
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Table 6: Distribution of cheat rates, discrete distribution, detailed estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Fully honest type (cheat rate equals 0):
Share in population 0.177 0.171 0.166
(0.037) (0.040) (0.042)
Intermediate type I:
Share in population 0.273 0.272 0.271
(0.030) (0.032) (0.035)
Cheat rate 0.105 0.100 0.096
(0.020) (0.019) (0.018)
Intermediate type II:
Share in population 0.196 0.195 0.193
(0.022) (0.023) (0.027)
Cheat rate 0.355 0.343 0.333
(0.021) (0.026) (0.031)
Intermediate type III:
Share in population 0.074 0.071 0.058
(0.012) (0.015) (0.023)
Cheat rate 0.680 0.642 0.589
(0.022) (0.046) (0.058)
Intermediate type IV:
Share in population 0.015 0.060 0.032
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Cheat rate 0.952 0.892 0.755
(0.007) (0.053) (0.052)
Intermediate type V:
Share in population - 0.177 0.068
(0.040) (0.027)
Cheat rate - 0.986 0.922
(0.012) (0.017)
Intermediate type VI:
Share - - 0.212
(0.032)
Cheat rate - - 0.992
(0.003)
Fully dishonest type (cheat rate equals 1):
Share 0.138 0.054 <0.001
(0.015) (0.052)
Log likelihood -2841 -2833 -2832
Akaike IC 5773 5741 5751
Bayesian IC 5701 5689 5689
p-value, LR-test, H0 : Model (1) - <0.01 <0.01
p-value, LR-test, H0 : Model (2) - - 0.037
The table shows maximum likelihood estimates for the distribution of cheat rates based on three
different model specifications. Each model assumes that there exist fully honest and dishonest
individuals and then some number of intermediate types. For each model the estimated population
shares and the estimated cheat rates for the intermediate types is shown along with the Log
Likelihood and Information criteria (IC). Bootstrapped standard errors are in parenthesis. The last
rows show p-values of likelihood ratio tests, based on the parametric bootstrap of McLachlan (1987).
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more, as Model (2) estimates that 5.4 percent of individuals are fully dishonest, while
Model (3) actually estimates that essentially noone in the population is fully dishonest.
This difference, however, is much less stark when one notes that both models also estimate
the existence of a large group of individuals who cheat almost all the time: Model (3)
estimates that 21.2 percent of the population belong to a discrete type that cheats 99.2
percent of the time, while Model (2) estimates that 17.7 percent of the population belongs
to a type that cheats 98.6 percent of the time. Accordingly, both models imply that 21-23
percent of the population cheat more than 98 percent of the time.17
Finally, Panels A and B of Figure 7 illustrate both the fit and similarity of Models
(2) and (3) by showing the predicted distribution of reported wins for each of the models
along with the actual distribution observed in the data. The predicted distribution under
the two models is very similar and provides a good fit to the data.
A.2.4 Comparing Results Using Continuous and Discrete Distributions
Given the discussion in Section A.2.1 regarding the pros and cons of using a continuous
vs discrete parametric family, it is instructive to compare the results we get using the
two approaches. In Figure 9 we plot the estimated CDFs of the preferred models from
the previous two subsections: The continuous distribution using a two component Beta-
mixture, and the two discrete distributions with either 7 or 8 discrete types. We note that
the estimated CDFs from the three models follow each other quite closely. Accordingly,
the results from the three different models also yield quite similar conclusions regarding
the heterogeneity in dishonesty. All three models imply that the standard deviation of
cheat rates is 0.39.
If we focus instead on the share of people who are practically completely honest or
dishonest, however, we note that the discrete models tend to imply a higher fraction of
17The fact that the precise distribution of individuals across the most dishonest types is sensitive to
the choice parametric model but that the share of individuals cheating more that 98 percent of the time
is not, illustrates the limits to what we can identify in our data. When respondents repeat the dice game
40 times, the difference in the expected number of reported wins between a fully dishonest individual
and an individual with a cheat rate of 98.6 percent is less than one half win. Accordingly, the estimated
shares become sensitive to the choice parametric model and the standard errors become large. If we lump
the most dishonest types together however and simply ask what share of people cheat more than 0.98
percent, our data is much more informative.
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Figure 7: Estimated distributions of dishonesty using discrete distributions
Panel A: Distribution of dishonesty, 7 discrete types, Model (2)
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Panel B: Distribution of dishonesty, 8 discrete types, Model (3)
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The two panels show the estimated distribution of dishonesty using different discrete distributions. The
x-axis show the cheat rate for each of the discrete types, while the y-axis shows the population shares
of each of the types along with 95 percent confidence intervals based on bootstrap standard errors. The
confidence interval for the fully honest type is omitted in Panel B since its population share is estimated to
be zero and thus be on the boundary of the parameter space.
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Figure 8: Actual vs predicted distributions of reported wins using discrete distributions
Panel A: Distribution of reported wins, 7 discrete types, Model (2)
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Panel B: Distribution of reported wins, 8 discrete types, Model (3)
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The two panels show the observed distribution of correct guesses in the data as well as the predicted
distribution based on the estimated distribution of cheat rates using discrete distributions. Panel
A shows results for Model (2) of Table 6, which assumes that there are 7 discrete types, while
Panel B shows results for Model (3), which allows for 8 discrete types.
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these “extreme” types. Using the continuous two component Beta-mixture, we estimate
that the share of individuals cheating less than 2 percent of the time is 14.0 percent and
the share of individuals cheating more than 98 percent of the time is 17.0 percent. When
using the discrite distributions the corresponding shares are instead 16.6-17.1 percent and
21-23 percent.
Finally, we note that assuming a continuous distribution allows us to obtain a good
fit to the data with a more parsimonious model. The preferred continuous model (the
two component Beta-mixture) only has five free parameters, while the preferred discrete
models have eleven and thirteen parameters respectively.18 Accordingly, we see that
model selection based on the Akaike or Bayesian IC that penalize models with more free
parameters would imply that the continuous distribution is preferred over the discrete
distribution.
A.2.5 Joint Estimation of Cheat Rate and Job Preference Distribution
We finish this section by presenting estimates of the joint distribution of dishonesty and
job preferences using the Maximum Likelihood estimator presented in Section A.1.6. We
again do this two different ways, treating the distribution of cheat rates as either discrete
or continuous. When using a discrete distribution we focus on the model with seven
discrete types, which yielded a positive estimated population shares for all types.19 For
each of the seven types we then estimate a separate probability of preferring a public
service career. As in the main text, we define an individual to prefer a public service career
if the individual ranked public administration in the top two of the eight job options in
our survey.
For the continuous distribution we use a two component Beta-mixture. In this case,
however, we need to impose a functional form on the probability of preferring public
service as function of the cheat rate. To allow for a flexible relationship between job
18For the two component Beta-mixture, the free parameters are the mean and the variance of each
of the two components in the mixture as well as the mixture weight of the first component. For the
discrete models, the free parameters are the population share and cheat rate for each of the five or six
intermediate types and the population share of the fully honest type.
19Types with a zero share obviously do not ever appear in the population. This creates an identification
problem since we can not identify job preferences for types we never observe.
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Figure 9: Estimated cumulative distribution functions using different models
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The Figure shows the estimated cumulative distribution functions for the distribution of cheat
rates when using either a two component Beta-mixture, a discrete distribution with 7 types
or a discrete distribution with 8 types.
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prefences and dishonesty, we use a cubic polynomial in the cheat rate and apply the
logistic function to restrict the probabilities to be between zero and one:
P (Xi = 1|θi) = m(Xi = 1|θi) = 1
1 + exp
(
−∑3j=0 κj(θi)j)
Panels A and B of Figure 10 shows the results using the two Models. The dots and
solid line shows the conditional probability of preferring public service as a function of
the cheat rate, while the dashed line and bars show the estimated distribution of cheat
rates.20
The two panels of the figure show a very similar pattern. Among the most honest
individuals, the probability of preferring public service is about 53 percent however this
share falls rapidly with the cheat rate. Among individuals who cheat 35 percent of the
time the share preferring public service is down to just under 40 percent. For individuals
with cheat rates above 50 percent, however job preferences appear more stable. For these
individuals, the share preferring public service ranges from 29 percent and 37 percent
across the two panels.
Overall, we see that the systematic self-selection of honest individuals into public
service, is driven by particularly strong preferences for public service among the most
honest individuals, while the preferences for public service jobs differ less across the
moderately to very dishonest.
20Since we are estimating the job preferences and the distribution of cheat rates jointly, the estimated
distributions will not necessarily be the same as the ones in Sections A.2.2 and A.2.3. As the Figures
show, however, we see only very slight differences in the distributions.
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Figure 10: Jointly estimated cheat rate and job preference distributions
Panel A: Estimates using two component Beta-mixture
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Panel B: Estimates using discrete distribution with 7 types
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The panels show joint estimates of the distribution of cheat rates and job preferences. Panel A shows
results using a two component Beta-mixture for the distribution of cheat rates and the logistic function of a
polynomial for the job preference probabilities. The solid line shows the share of individuals who prefer
public service as a function of the cheat rate (left axis). The dashed line shows the probability density
function for the distribution of cheat rates (right axis). The right axis is truncated as the function goes to
infinity at the endpoints. Panel B shows results when modelling the distribution of cheat rates using a
discrete distribution with 7 types and allowing for a different conditional job preferencer probability for
each type. The x-axis shows the cheat rates for each of the discrete types and the dots show the share of
each type preferring a public service career (left axis). The bars show the population shares of the types
(right axis). 68
A.3 Job Choices of Dishonest Students
In this section we look at which job categories dishonest students are particularly likely to
prefer. To this end, Table 7 splits the sample into an honest and a dishonest half based
on the estimated cheat rate and then compares how many students in each group rank
the eight different job categories as their most preferred. The last row of the table thus
restates the paper’s main results by showing that public administration is ranked as the
top job much more often for honest students than dishonest students: 26 percent of the
honest half of students rank public administration as their preferred job, while only 17
percent of the dishonest half do so.
Looking at which jobs the dishonest half of students rank in the top instead of public
administration, we see that by far the most important category is the financial sector. 19
percent of dishonest students rank the financial sector at the top versus only 8.6 percent
among honest students: a bigger gap than we observe for any other job category. While
jobs in the various listed categories may differ in many different dimensions, financial
sector jobs particularly stand out as by far the best paid jobs for our student population.
The popularity of financial sector jobs among dishonest students thus dovetails our findings
regarding pro-social vs. pecuniary motivations. Dishonest individuals self-select out of the
public sector jobs and into high-paying private sector jobs in part because they are more
pecuniarily motivated.
Finally, two other job categories show statistically significant differences in how many
honest vs. dishonest students rank them at the top. Dishonest students are 5.5 percentage
points more likely to rank a central bank job at the top, while honest students are 5.3
percentage points more likely to rank a job in a political party or lobby organization at the
top. These differences likely reflect that central bank jobs often serve as stepping stones
for other financial sector jobs and that jobs in political parties and lobby organizations
serve as stepping stones for running for political office.
69
Ta
bl
e
7:
To
p
ra
nk
ed
jo
b
ca
te
go
rie
s
am
on
g
le
ss
an
d
m
or
e
di
sh
on
es
t
To
p
ra
nk
ed
jo
b
Es
t.
ch
ea
t
ra
te
<
m
ed
ia
n
Es
t.
ch
ea
t
ra
te
≥
m
ed
ia
n
D
iff
er
en
ce
p-
va
lu
e
Fi
na
nc
ia
ls
ec
to
r
8.
62
18
.9
4
10
.3
1
<
0.
01
C
en
tr
al
ba
nk
4.
66
10
.1
6
5.
50
<
0.
01
O
th
er
pr
iv
at
e
19
.1
1
20
.7
9
1.
67
0.
60
La
w
fir
m
11
.8
9
11
.5
5
-0
.3
4
0.
96
O
th
er
pu
bl
ic
3.
96
3.
23
-0
.7
3
0.
69
Pu
bl
ic
re
la
tio
ns
6.
76
4.
16
-2
.6
0
0.
13
Po
lit
ic
al
pa
rt
y
or
lo
bb
y
or
g.
19
.1
1
13
.8
6
-5
.2
6
0.
05
Pu
bl
ic
ad
m
in
ist
ra
tio
n
25
.8
7
17
.3
2
-8
.5
5
<
0.
01
T
he
ta
bl
e
ex
am
in
es
to
p
ra
nk
ed
jo
b
ca
te
go
rie
s
am
on
g
m
or
e
di
sh
on
es
t
vs
.
le
ss
di
sh
on
es
t
st
ud
en
ts
.
Ea
ch
ro
w
co
rr
es
po
nd
s
to
a
di
ffe
re
nt
jo
b
ca
te
go
ry
.
T
he
fir
st
nu
m
er
ic
al
co
lu
m
n
sh
ow
s
th
e
fra
ct
io
n
of
st
ud
en
ts
ra
nk
in
g
ea
ch
jo
b
ca
te
go
ry
as
th
e
pr
ef
er
re
d
on
e
am
on
g
st
ud
en
ts
w
ith
an
es
tim
at
ed
ch
ea
t
ra
te
s
be
lo
w
th
e
m
ed
ia
n.
T
he
se
co
nd
nu
m
er
ica
lc
ol
um
n
sh
ow
s
th
e
fra
ct
io
n
of
st
ud
en
ts
ra
nk
in
g
ea
ch
jo
b
ca
te
go
ry
as
th
e
pr
ef
er
re
d
on
e
am
on
g
st
ud
en
ts
w
ith
an
es
tim
at
ed
ch
ea
t
ra
te
s
ab
ov
e
th
e
m
ed
ia
n.
T
he
la
st
tw
o
co
lu
m
ns
sh
ow
s
th
e
di
ffe
re
nc
e
in
th
es
e
fra
ct
io
ns
fo
r
ea
ch
of
jo
b
ca
te
go
ry
as
we
ll
as
th
e
p
-v
al
ue
fo
r
te
st
in
g
w
he
th
er
th
e
di
ffe
re
nc
e
is
ze
ro
.
70
A.4 Comparing Dishonesty Measure with Previous Work
As discussed in the main text, our experimental approach to measuring dishonesty has
been widely used in the literature and behavior in this type of experiment has been shown
to predict fraudulent behavior among public sector employees by Hanna and Wang (2017).
As always however, differences in stakes, framing and other implementation decisions may
be a concern when comparing results to existing paper or relying on past validations of
the experimental measures. In particular, since we draw on the variation in Jiang (2013),
our computer-based dice guessing game differs from the canonical dice under cup game of
Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) by asking to participants report (and possibly lie
about) their own previous guess about a dice roll instead of reporting on the outcome of
the dice roll.
To assess whether and how our specific implementation may have affected our experi-
mental measures of inherent propensity for dishonest, this section compares the data from
our survey experiment in Denmark with data on Indian students from the closely related
experiment of Hanna and Wang (2017). In Hanna and Wang (2017) individual dishonesty
was measured by asking each student to perform and report the outcome of 42 dice rolls,
while paying 0.5 Indian Rupees (INR) for each eye rolled across the 42 dice rolls.
In Table A.4 we examine the amount of dishonesty observed in the two data sets by
comparing observed individual winnings in the two dishonesty games to the predicted
distribution of winnings under full honesty.21 In both data sets dishonesty is pervasive.
89 percent of students have winnings above the median in both cases. Overall, however,
dishonest behavior appears somewhat higher in the Danish sample, especially towards
the top of the distribution. 60 percent of students in our samples have winnings that are
above the 99th percentile, compared to 33 percent of students in the Indian sample. This
difference in the level of observed dishonesty is consistent with the conclusions of Jiang
(2013), who finds that our dice guessing variation of the game leads to higher levels of
dishonesty.
21In our experiment, the expected distribution of winnings under full honesty is distributed as a
binomial random variable with 40 trials and a success probability of 16 multiplied by 2 DKK. In Hanna
and Wang (2017) the distribution of points under full honesty is simply the sum of 42 discrete uniform
variables on 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 multiplied by 0.5 INR.
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Since the focus of the present paper is not on the level of dishonesty but on the
correlation between inherent dishonesty and job preferences, differences in the measured
level of dishonesty caused by the experimental design is less problematic. A much more
severe concern is that our experimental design may bias the correlation between dishonesty
and other variables. To assess this concern, we can look at the correlations between
measured dishonesty and other respondent attributes in our data relative to the data from
Hanna and Wang (2017). Three of the respondent attributes from our main analysis was
also used in the analysis of Hanna and Wang (2017): GPA, donation in a dictator game
and gender. In addition, our survey included a measure of External Locus of Control,
which is used extensively in Hanna and Wang (2017).
In Table 9 we examine raw and partial correlations between dishonesty and these
four attributes in the two data sets. To deal with differences in answer scales, currency
denominations and grading scales, we standardize all the continuous variables within
the two data sets and use standardized total winnings as our measure of individual
dishonesty.22 Looking at Columns 1 and 2, we see that the pattern of raw correlations is
the same across the two samples. Dishonesty exhibits a statistically significant negative
correlation with donations in the dictator game and a statistically significant positive
correlation with being male. There is no significant correlation between dishonesty and
GPA or External Locus of Control. Looking at the size of the observed correlations in the
two samples, they are also very similar and are never significantly different from each other
at conventional levels. For example, the correlation between donations in the dictator
game in Hanna and Wang (2017)’s sample is -0.20, while it is -0.27 in our sample.
In Columns 3 and 4 we instead examine partial correlations by regressing individual
dishonesty on the four other attributes simultaneously. A very similar picture emerges here.
In both samples, the relationship between dishonesty and gender is no longer statistically
significant once the other attributes are controlled for but dictator donations remains
a statistically significant predictor in both samples. The actual size of the estimated
22The estimated cheat rate measure that we examine in the main text is a linear transformation of
total winnings in our experiment. After standardization, we would thus get numerically the same results
if we used our estimated cheat rates instead of total winnings. The main dishonesty measure in Hanna
and Wang (2017) is total points in the dice game which is also a linear transformation of total winnings.
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coefficients are again very similar across the two samples and never significantly different
from each other. Finally, we see that the four attributes explain a similar fraction of the
variation in dishonesty in the two samples. The R2 from the linear regressions are 0.05
and 0.08 respectively.
To the extent that the true correlation between dishonesty and these four attributes
is stable across Denmark and India, the very similar estimated correlations in Table 9
suggests that our experimental measure of dishonesty is comparable to the one used in
Hanna and Wang (2017) despite any differences in the implementation of the experiment.
Table 8: Comparing the level of dice game cheating with previous literature
Hanna and Danish
Wang (2017) sample
Share above 50th percentile 0.89 0.89
of honest distribution
Share above 75th percentile 0.74 0.84
of honest distribution
Share above 90th percentile 0.59 0.79
of honest distribution
Share above 99th percentile 0.33 0.60
of honest distribution
The table compares the amount of dice game cheat-
ing in the present paper’s sample of Danish students
with the amount of cheating among Indian students
in the related experiment conducted by Hanna and
Wang (2017). The rows of the table refer to differ-
ent percentiles of the distribution of winnings that
is expected under full honesty. The columns show
how many participants had winnings above those
percentiles in the two experiments.
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Table 9: Comparing correlates of dice game cheating with previous literature
Raw Linear
Correlations Regression
Hanna and Danish Hanna and Danish
Wang (2017) sample Wang (2017) sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GPA, standardized 0.046 0.014 0.050 0.032
(0.051) (0.035) (0.052) (0.033)
Dictator donation, standardized -0.192** -0.269** -0.189** -0.271**
(0.054) (0.032) (0.052) (0.033)
Male 0.125* 0.076* 0.170 0.055
(0.058) (0.034) (0.111) (0.046)
Locus of control, standardized 0.015 -0.045 0.005 -0.058
(0.036) (0.035) (0.036) (0.034)
N 614 862 614 862
R2 0.050 0.078
The table compares correlates of dishonesty between the present paper’s sample of Danish
students and the sample of Indian students in the related experiment conducted by Hanna
and Wang (2017). Columns (1) and (2) show raw correlations between total winnings and
other characteristics and experimental measures in the two different samples. Columns
(3) and (4) regresses standardized total winnings on other attributes and experimental
measures in the two different samples. The attributes and measures used are standardized
GPA, standardized donations in the dictator game, an indicator for being male and a
standardized measure of external locus of control. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
Robust standard errors are reported for the Danish sample, while standard errors clustered
at the session level are reported for the Indian sample (see Hanna and Wang (2017) for
details).∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01.
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A.5 Validating Job Preference Measures
One potential concern with the data from our survey experiment is that students’ stated
job preferences may be poor measures of actual job preferences at the time when students
finish their degrees and enter the labor market. While most of the other experimental
measurements in the survey are incentivized using monetary stakes, the job preference
questions are not. This may raise questions about the validity of the given answers.
Moreover, it is possible that students’ job preferences may change between the time of
the survey and the time of graduation.
In this section we attempt to validate our job preference measures against actual job
outcomes after graduation using administrative data. In doing so we exploit the fact
that students in our survey experiment have been recruited from university registers
that contain the unique Danish person identifier (the so-called “Central Person Registry”
number). Because of this we are able to link individual student responses from the survey
experiment to centrally-collected administrative data on completed degrees and actual
employment outcomes.23
Because of long degree completion times and because of time lags in the availability of
administrative data, a comprehensive examination of the actual labor market outcomes
for the students in our experiment is not possible.24 For a subset of the oldest students
in the data, however, we are able to examine how their stated job preferences correlate
with actual job outcomes after graduation. From the most recent administrative data
available to us, we are able to construct information on whether students in our sample
had completed their degree by October 2016, whether they held a job as of January 2017
and if so whether their job was in public administration.
After matching our sample of 862 students to the administrative data, we find that
155 individuals (18 percent) had both completed their degree by October 2016 and had a
23We note that actual job outcomes may also be an imperfect measure of job preferences. Actual job
outcomes conflate the job preferences of individuals with the screening and sorting that occurs when
people are hired into public service jobs. The questions in our survey experiment can only aim to measure
the job preferences of respondents.
24It will be several years until such an examination is possible. Historically, a substantial fraction of
students in our study population have taken up to a full seven years to finish their degree and enter the
labor market. The youngest students in our sample (those starting at the university in 2014) thus will
not be fully in the labor market until 2021.
75
job in January 2017. Beyond limiting statistical power, having job outcomes only for this
modest subset of individuals raises obvious concerns about selection. Nonetheless, the
data allows us to get some sense of how stated job preferences in the survey experiment
predicts actual post-graduation job outcomes.
Table A.5 shows regression results from the linked data. In Column 1 we regress an
indicator for having a public administration job in January 2017 on the main measure of
job preferences used in the paper: an indicator for ranking public administration among
the top two jobs in the survey experiment. We see that the stated preferences in the
survey are highly predictive of the actual job outcome. Individuals who ranked public
administration among the top two jobs in the survey experiment are 48 percentage points
more likely to be in a public administration job in January 2017 and this difference in
highly significant. In Columns 2 to 5, we repeat this specification for the other measures of
public service job preferences used in the paper. With the exception of the public service
motivation score, all of the measures show a positive and highly significant correlation
with the actual job outcome. For public service motivation, the coefficient is also positive
but not significantly different from zero (p = 0.15). With the caveat that we are only able
to examine a modest subset of our respondents, we overall conclude that the stated job
preferences seem to correlate very well with observed job outcomes.
Finally, given that we have linked the experimental data linked to actual job outcomes,
it is natural to also ask how our experimental measure of dishonesty relates to actual
job outcomes in the administrative data. We examine this in the rest of Table A.5. We
first check to what extent our main results on dishonesty and (stated) job preferences
hold in the subsample of respondents where we have linked data on post-graduation job
outcomes. Focusing only on this subsample, Column 6 replicates the main specification
from the paper by regressing the estimated cheat rate on an indicator for ranking public
administration among the top two jobs. We exactly replicate the point estimate of 0.1
from the main paper. With the smaller number of observations and resulting larger
standard errors, however, we can no longer rule out a zero coefficient at conventional
levels of significance (p = 0.14). Next, in Column 7 we regress the estimated cheat rate
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on the indicator for having a job in public administration in January 2017. We find a
similar negative estimate: respondents with a public administration job in January 2017
on cheated 9 percent less on average than those who held a different job in January 2017.
As in Column 6, however, this difference is not statistically significant (p = 0.20). With
the important caveats that estimates are imprecise and that we are looking at a selected
sample of respondents, these results are at least indicative that the self-selection pattern
in the survey experiment carries over to actual job outcomes.
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A.6 Win Rates Across Dice Rolls
To examine how dishonest behavior evolves over the repetitions of our dice game, Figure
11 shows the average win rate for each of the 40 repetitions of the dice game. With the
possible exception of the very first roll, we see that the win is quite stable across rounds.
Figure 11: Win rates across dice rolls
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The figure shows the win rate across individuals separately for each of the 40 repetitions
of the dice game.
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A.7 Robustness Checks
In this section, we present a series of robustness checks to shore up various concerns with
our empirical analysis:
First, our implementation of the dice-under-cup approach differs from many previous
implementations in that we ask respondents to play many rounds of the game. This
repetition may raise concerns that respondents become fatigued or otherwise change their
game perception or behavior. As a robustness check, Tables 11-15 and 18-22 therefore
reexamines the correlation between dishonesty, job preferences and other attributes using
different subsets of the 40 dice rolls in our data. In particular, we consider using only the
very first dice roll, dice rolls 1-10, dice rolls 11-20, dice rolls 21-30 or dice rolls 31-40.
Second, given the student population we focus on, another concern is that the behavior
of some respondents may be affected by knowledge of the existing academic literature
on dishonesty and its relation to our experimental tasks. At the end of the survey
experiment, we asked respondents whether they had prior familiarity with any of its
elements. Independent coding of the responses show that 40 respondents expressed
awareness of either dice-under-cup games, similar experimental games (e.g. coin flipping),
or explicitly mentioned the potential for cheating. Table 16 and 23 reexamines the
correlation between dishonesty, job preferences and other attributes after excluding these
respondents.
Third, our sample includes 143 respondents who cheat on all dice rolls and report
the maximum number of correct guesses in our dice-under-cup games. As an additional
robustness check, Table 17 and 24 reexamines the correlation between dishonesty, job
preferences and other attributes without these respondents.
As Tables 11 to 24 show, the papers conclusions are robust to all three alternative
sample restrictions. Besides the obvious loss of precision when dropping observations, the
alternative specifications lead to very similar results as the ones presented in the main
text.
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Table 11: Estimated cheat rates and public service job preferences using only the first
dice game
Estimated cheat rates for first dice roll
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Public administation ranked ≤ 2 −0.097∗
(0.041)
Higher ranking of public administration −0.018
(0.010)
Public service motivation score −0.134∗∗
(0.039)
Public sector picked at current wage −0.072
(0.045)
Probability of public administration −0.103
(0.162)
Constant 0.359∗∗ 0.256∗∗ 0.645∗∗ 0.338∗∗ 0.339∗∗
(0.027) (0.039) (0.097) (0.024) (0.039)
N 862 862 860 862 858
The table shows regressions of students’ estimated cheat rates on various measures of
public service job preferences, where the cheat rate estimated is based only on the first dice
game. The job preference measures are an indicator for whether public administration was
ranked in the top two of the eight job categories, the flipped actual rank given to public
administration (so that a higher value means a stronger preference for public administration),
the public service motivation score, an indicator for whether the public sector was picked
in the wage scenario corresponding to the current wage gap and the subjective probability
of ending up in public administration. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗p<0.05;
∗∗p<0.01.
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Table 12: Estimated cheat rate and public service job preferences using only dice rolls
1-10
Estimated cheat rate for dice rolls 1-10
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Public administation ranked ≤ 2 −0.088∗∗∗
(0.027)
Higher ranking of public administration −0.021∗∗∗
(0.006)
Public service motivation score −0.146∗∗∗
(0.026)
Public sector picked at current wage −0.076∗∗∗
(0.029)
Probability of public administration −0.254∗∗
(0.103)
Constant 0.437∗∗∗ 0.327∗∗∗ 0.756∗∗∗ 0.421∗∗∗ 0.453∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.026) (0.066) (0.016) (0.025)
N 862 862 860 862 858
The table shows regressions of subjects’ estimated cheat rate on various measures of public service
job preferences, where the cheat rate estimated is based only on the dice rolls 1-10. The job
preference measures are an indicator for whether public administration was ranked in the top
two of the eight job categories, the flipped actual rank given to public administration (so that a
higher value means a stronger preference for public administration), the public service motivation
score, an indicator for whether the public sector was picked in the wage scenario corresponding
to the current wage gap, the subjective probability of ending up in public administration. Robust
standard errors in parenthesis. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Table 13: Estimated cheat rate and public service job preferences using only dice rolls
11-20
Estimated cheat rate for dice rolls 11-20
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Public administation ranked ≤ 2 −0.096∗∗∗
(0.028)
Higher ranking of public administration −0.022∗∗∗
(0.007)
Public service motivation score −0.136∗∗∗
(0.028)
Public sector picked at current wage −0.074∗∗
(0.031)
Probability of public administration −0.285∗∗∗
(0.111)
Constant 0.460∗∗∗ 0.345∗∗∗ 0.753∗∗∗ 0.441∗∗∗ 0.479∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.027) (0.070) (0.017) (0.027)
N 862 862 860 862 858
The table shows regressions of subjects’ estimated cheat rate on various measures of public service
job preferences, where the cheat rate estimated is based only on the dice rolls 11-20. The job
preference measures are an indicator for whether public administration was ranked in the top
two of the eight job categories, the flipped actual rank given to public administration (so that a
higher value means a stronger preference for public administration), the public service motivation
score, an indicator for whether the public sector was picked in the wage scenario corresponding
to the current wage gap, the subjective probability of ending up in public administration. Robust
standard errors in parenthesis. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Table 14: Estimated cheat rate and public service job preferences using only dice rolls
21-30
Estimated cheat rate for dice rolls 21-30
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Public administation ranked ≤ 2 −0.113∗∗∗
(0.029)
Higher ranking of public administration −0.024∗∗∗
(0.007)
Public service motivation score −0.165∗∗∗
(0.027)
Public sector picked at current wage −0.100∗∗∗
(0.032)
Probability of public administration −0.339∗∗∗
(0.114)
Constant 0.482∗∗∗ 0.353∗∗∗ 0.837∗∗∗ 0.462∗∗∗ 0.505∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.027) (0.069) (0.017) (0.027)
N 862 862 860 862 858
The table shows regressions of subjects’ estimated cheat rate on various measures of public service
job preferences, where the cheat rate estimated is based only on the dice rolls 21-30. The job
preference measures are an indicator for whether public administration was ranked in the top
two of the eight job categories, the flipped actual rank given to public administration (so that a
higher value means a stronger preference for public administration), the public service motivation
score, an indicator for whether the public sector was picked in the wage scenario corresponding
to the current wage gap, the subjective probability of ending up in public administration. Robust
standard errors in parenthesis. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
Table 15: Estimated cheat rate and public service job preferences using only dice rolls
31-40
Estimated cheat rate for dice rolls 31-40
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Public administation ranked ≤ 2 −0.111∗∗∗
(0.029)
Higher ranking of public administration −0.023∗∗∗
(0.007)
Public service motivation score −0.161∗∗∗
(0.028)
Public sector picked at current wage −0.109∗∗∗
(0.032)
Probability of public administration −0.261∗∗
(0.112)
Constant 0.479∗∗∗ 0.355∗∗∗ 0.825∗∗∗ 0.463∗∗∗ 0.487∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.027) (0.070) (0.017) (0.027)
N 862 862 860 862 858
The table shows regressions of subjects’ estimated cheat rate on various measures of public service
job preferences, where the cheat rate estimated is based only on the dice rolls 31-40. The job
preference measures are an indicator for whether public administration was ranked in the top
two of the eight job categories, the flipped actual rank given to public administration (so that a
higher value means a stronger preference for public administration), the public service motivation
score, an indicator for whether the public sector was picked in the wage scenario corresponding
to the current wage gap, the subjective probability of ending up in public administration. Robust
standard errors in parenthesis. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Table 16: Estimated cheat rates and job preferences excluding students with dice game
experience
Estimated cheat rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Public administration rank ≤ 2 −0.103∗∗
(0.027)
Higher ranking of public administration −0.022∗∗
(0.007)
Public service motivation score −0.144∗∗
(0.026)
Public sector picked at current wage −0.093∗∗
(0.030)
Probability of public administration −0.295∗∗
(0.109)
Constant 0.453∗∗ 0.332∗∗ 0.762∗∗ 0.435∗∗ 0.470∗∗
(0.018) (0.026) (0.067) (0.016) (0.026)
N 822 822 820 822 818
The table shows regressions of students’ estimated cheat rates on various measures of public
service job preferences, excluding students that explicitly indicated that they were cheating
or had prior knowledge of the dice task. The exclusion was based on students responses in
an open-ended text box in which they were asked about their impression of the survey and
whether they had prior familiarity with any of its elements. The exclusion is based on an
independent coding of the responses. It indicated that 40 students expressed awareness of
either dice-under-cup games, similar experimental games (e.g. coin flipping), or explicitly
mentioned the potential for cheating. The job preference measures are an indicator for
whether public administration was ranked in the top two of the eight job categories, the
flipped actual ranked given to public administration (so that a higher value means a stronger
preference for public administration), the public service motivation score, an indicator for
whether the public sector was picked in the wage scenario corresponding to the current wage
gap and the subjective probability of ending up in public administration. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01.
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Table 17: Estimated cheat rates and job preferences excluding students with 100% win
rate
Estimated cheat rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Public administation ranked ≤ 2 −0.080∗∗
(0.024)
Higher ranking of public administration −0.017∗∗
(0.006)
Public service motivation score −0.093∗∗
(0.025)
Public sector picked at current wage −0.053∗
(0.027)
Probability of public administration −0.209∗
(0.094)
Constant 0.342∗∗ 0.249∗∗ 0.537∗∗ 0.322∗∗ 0.351∗∗
(0.017) (0.023) (0.065) (0.015) (0.023)
N 719 719 717 719 716
The table shows regressions of students’ estimated cheat rates on various measures of public
service job preferences, excluding students who reported a correct guess for all dice rolls. The
job preference measures are an indicator for whether public administration was ranked in the
top two of the eight job categories, the flipped actual ranked given to public administration
(so that a higher value means a stronger preference for public administration), the public
service motivation score, an indicator for whether the public sector was picked in the wage
scenario corresponding to the current wage gap and the subjective probability of ending up in
public administration. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01.
Table 18: Estimated cheat rates and other attributes using only the first dice game
Estimated cheat rates for first dice roll
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
GPA (standardized) 0.019 0.028
(0.020) (0.020)
Picks risky lottery 0.053 0.025
(0.041) (0.042)
Job security rank ≤ 2 0.007 0.009
(0.063) (0.062)
Donation −0.011∗∗ −0.011∗∗
(0.003) (0.003)
Wage rank ≤ 2 0.034 −0.006
(0.045) (0.045)
Male 0.155∗∗ 0.143∗∗
(0.040) (0.042)
Constant 0.319∗∗ 0.291∗∗ 0.317∗∗ 0.396∗∗ 0.308∗∗ 0.235∗∗ 0.305∗∗
(0.020) (0.029) (0.022) (0.030) (0.024) (0.029) (0.043)
N 861 862 862 862 862 862 861
The table shows regressions of students’ estimated cheat rates on various measures of other
student attributes, where the cheat rate estimated is based only on the first dice game. The
measures of other attributes are GPA standardized by field, an indicator for choosing the
one of the two most risky lotteries, the amount donated in the dictator game, an indicator
for being male and indicators for whether job security and wage was ranked in the top two
of the five job characteristics ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01.
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Table 19: Estimated cheat rates and other attributes using only dice rolls 1-10
Estimated cheat rate for dice rolls 1-10
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
GPA (standardized) 0.013 0.019
(0.014) (0.013)
Picks risky lottery 0.030 0.030
(0.027) (0.028)
Job security ranked ≤ 2 0.004 0.001
(0.040) (0.039)
Donation −0.015∗∗∗ −0.014∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
Wage ranked ≤ 2 0.069∗∗ 0.037
(0.029) (0.029)
Male 0.057∗∗ 0.035
(0.027) (0.028)
Constant 0.401∗∗∗ 0.385∗∗∗ 0.399∗∗∗ 0.500∗∗∗ 0.380∗∗∗ 0.369∗∗∗ 0.454∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.019) (0.015) (0.019) (0.016) (0.019) (0.028)
N 861 862 862 862 862 862 861
The table shows regressions of students’ estimated cheat rates on various measures of other
student attributes, where the cheat rate estimated is based only on dice rolls 1-10. The measures
of other attributes are GPA standardized by field, an indicator for choosing the one of the two
most risky lotteries, the amount donated in the dictator game, an indicator for being male
and indicators for whether job security and wage was ranked in the top two of the five job
characteristics ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01.
Table 20: Estimated cheat rates and other attributes using only dice rolls 11-20
Estimated cheat rate for dice rolls 11-20
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
GPA (standardized) 0.004 0.010
(0.015) (0.014)
Picks risky lottery 0.036 0.036
(0.028) (0.029)
Job security ranked ≤ 2 −0.023 −0.027
(0.043) (0.041)
Donation −0.017∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
Wage ranked ≤ 2 0.081∗∗∗ 0.045
(0.030) (0.030)
Male 0.060∗∗ 0.032
(0.028) (0.029)
Constant 0.421∗∗∗ 0.402∗∗∗ 0.423∗∗∗ 0.533∗∗∗ 0.397∗∗∗ 0.388∗∗∗ 0.487∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.019) (0.015) (0.020) (0.017) (0.020) (0.029)
N 861 862 862 862 862 862 861
The table shows regressions of students’ estimated cheat rates on various measures of other
student attributes, where the cheat rate estimated is based only on dice rolls 11-20. The
measures of other attributes are GPA standardized by field, an indicator for choosing the one of
the two most risky lotteries, the amount donated in the dictator game, an indicator for being
male and indicators for whether job security and wage was ranked in the top two of the five job
characteristics ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01.
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Table 21: Estimated cheat rates and other attributes using only dice rolls 21-30
Estimated cheat rate for dice rolls 21-30
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
GPA (standardized) 0.010 0.017
(0.015) (0.015)
Picks risky lottery 0.038 0.040
(0.029) (0.029)
Job security ranked ≤ 2 0.020 0.017
(0.042) (0.040)
Donation −0.017∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
Wage ranked ≤ 2 0.084∗∗∗ 0.048
(0.031) (0.031)
Male 0.065∗∗ 0.036
(0.029) (0.029)
Constant 0.435∗∗∗ 0.415∗∗∗ 0.432∗∗∗ 0.552∗∗∗ 0.410∗∗∗ 0.400∗∗∗ 0.494∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.020) (0.015) (0.020) (0.017) (0.020) (0.030)
N 861 862 862 862 862 862 861
The table shows regressions of students’ estimated cheat rates on various measures of other
student attributes, where the cheat rate estimated is based only on the dice rolls 21-30. The
measures of other attributes are GPA standardized by field, an indicator for choosing the one of
the two most risky lotteries, the amount donated in the dictator game, an indicator for being
male and indicators for whether job security and wage was ranked in the top two of the five job
characteristics ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01.
Table 22: Estimated cheat rates and other attributes using only dice rolls 31-40
Estimated cheat rate for dice rolls 31-40
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
GPA (standardized) 0.003 0.009
(0.016) (0.015)
Picks risky lottery 0.038 0.039
(0.029) (0.030)
Job security ranked ≤ 2 0.005 0.003
(0.044) (0.042)
Donation −0.017∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
Wage ranked ≤ 2 0.097∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗
(0.032) (0.032)
Male 0.061∗∗ 0.031
(0.029) (0.030)
Constant 0.433∗∗∗ 0.414∗∗∗ 0.432∗∗∗ 0.547∗∗∗ 0.405∗∗∗ 0.400∗∗∗ 0.490∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.020) (0.016) (0.021) (0.017) (0.021) (0.030)
N 861 862 862 862 862 862 861
The table shows regressions of students’ estimated cheat rates on various measures of other
student attributes, where the cheat rate estimated is based only on dice rolls 31-40. The
measures of other attributes are GPA standardized by field, an indicator for choosing the one of
the two most risky lotteries, the amount donated in the dictator game, an indicator for being
male and indicators for whether job security and wage was ranked in the top two of the five job
characteristics ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01.
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Table 23: Estimated cheat rates and other attributes while excluding students with dice
game experience
Estimated cheat rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
GPA (standardized) 0.011 0.016
(0.014) (0.014)
Picks risky lottery 0.024 0.028
(0.027) (0.028)
Job security rank ≤ 2 0.016 0.013
(0.040) (0.038)
Donation −0.016∗∗ −0.016∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
Wage rank ≤ 2 0.089∗∗ 0.057
(0.030) (0.029)
Male 0.045 0.020
(0.027) (0.028)
Constant 0.409∗∗ 0.397∗∗ 0.407∗∗ 0.517∗∗ 0.383∗∗ 0.385∗∗ 0.472∗∗
(0.014) (0.019) (0.015) (0.019) (0.016) (0.019) (0.029)
N 821 822 822 822 822 822 821
The table shows regressions of students’ estimated cheat rates on various measures of
other student attributes while excluding students that explicitly indicated that they
were cheating or had prior knowledge of the dice task. The exclusion was based on
students responses in an open-ended text box in which they were asked about their
impression of the survey and whether they had prior familiarity with any of its elements.
The exlcusion is based on an independent coding of the responses. It indicated that 40
students expressed awareness of either dice-under-cup games, similar experimental games
(e.g. coin flipping), or explicitly mentioned the potential for cheating. The measures of
other attributes are GPA standardized by field, an indicator for choosing the one of the
two most risky lotteries, the amount donated in the dictator game, an indicator for being
male and indicators for whether job security and wage was ranked in the top two of the
five job characteristics. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01.
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Table 24: Estimated cheat rates and other attributes while excluding students with 100%
win rate
Estimated cheat rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
GPA (standardized) 0.002 0.006
(0.013) (0.012)
Picks risky lottery −0.005 0.004
(0.025) (0.024)
Job security rank ≤ 2 0.030 0.030
(0.036) (0.035)
Donation −0.014∗∗ −0.013∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
Wage rank ≤ 2 0.100∗∗ 0.076∗∗
(0.027) (0.027)
Male 0.013 −0.001
(0.025) (0.024)
Constant 0.307∗∗ 0.309∗∗ 0.303∗∗ 0.406∗∗ 0.278∗∗ 0.300∗∗ 0.375∗∗
(0.012) (0.017) (0.013) (0.019) (0.014) (0.017) (0.026)
N 718 719 719 719 719 719 718
The table shows regressions of students’ estimated cheat rates on various measures of
other student attributes while excluding students who reported a correct guess for all
dice rolls. The measures of other attributes are GPA standardized by field, an indicator
for choosing the one of the two most risky lotteries, the amount donated in the dictator
game, an indicator for being male and indicators for whether job security and wage was
ranked in the top two of the five job characteristics ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01.
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A.8 Self-selection Conditional on Attributes, Other Measures
In the main text we analyzed self-selection conditional on other attributes by regressing the
estimated cheat rate on our main job preferences measure while including various controls.
In particular, we found that the relationship between dishonesty and job preferences drops
by 30 percent if we control for dictator game donation and an indicator for whether the
wage was ranked as one of the two most important job characteristics. In this section, we
examine how these results change if we use alternative job preferences measures.
In Table 25, we regress the estimated cheat rate on various measure of job preferences
while controlling for dictator game donations and whether the wage was ranked as
important job characteristic (corresponding to Column 8 of Table 5 in the main text).
Comparing the estimated coefficients on the job preferences measures to the corresponding
estimates without controls (Columns 2-5 of Table 2 in the main text), we see a very similar
pattern to the one we found for our main job preference variable. For the first three job
measures the coefficient drops by between 32 and 36 percent when the controls are added.
For the last measure, the drop is a bit larger (44 percent) so that the coefficient is no
longer significantly different from zero once controls are added (p = 0.11).
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Table 25: Conditional results using other job measures
Estimated cheat rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Higher ranking of public administration -0.015*
(0.006)
Public service motivation score -0.103**
(0.027)
Public sector picked at current wage -0.058*
(0.029)
Probability of public administration -0.160
(0.100)
Donation -0.015** -0.014** -0.015** -0.015**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Wage ranked ≤ 2 0.043 0.038 0.048 0.049
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Constant 0.464** 0.758** 0.529** 0.545**
(0.031) (0.068) (0.024) (0.030)
N 862 860 862 858
The table shows regressions of students’ estimated cheat rates on preference for public
service, while controlling for various measures of other student attributes. The job
preference measures are the flipped actual rank given to public administration (so that a
higher value means a stronger preference for public administration), the public service
motivation score, an indicator for whether the public sector was picked in the wage
scenario corresponding to the current wage gap and the subjective probability of ending
up in public administration. The measures of other attributes are the amount donated in
the dictator game and an indicators for whether the wage was ranked in the top two of
the five job characteristics. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01.
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A.9 Analyzing Representativeness and Selective Non-participation
This section examines potential issues with selective nonparticipation among students
invited for participation in our survey experiment. The concern is that students self-select
into participation based on particular traits which creates selection bias in our estimates.
In our experiment, 862 students ended up participating. Relative to the 3,000 e-mail
invitations that was sent out, this yields a response rate of 29 percent.
One strength of our experimental design is that since we sample and invite students
from the university registers, we have data also on the characteristics of those who do not
participate. Table 26 compares participants to nonparticipants in terms of the available
characteristics: field of study, age, gender and study experience as measured by the
number of earned ECTS point (European Credit Transfer System). We see clear difference
in the participation rate across fields and some moderate systematic differences in other
characteristics, with participants being on average younger and more likely to be male
than the average nonparticipant. There are no mean differences between the two groups
on study experience, although we find evidence of systematic differences in the distribution
of the study experience variable.
Table 26: Comparing participants to invited non-participants
mean mean t test KS
participant nonparticipant diff p value p value
Age 24.128 25.176 -1.049 0.000 0.000
Female 0.466 0.503 -0.037 0.067 -
Study experience (ECTS points) 45.112 44.482 0.630 0.754 0.066
Field: Law 0.182 0.390 -0.207 <0.001 -
Field: Economics 0.445 0.294 0.152 <0.001 -
Field: Politial Science 0.369 0.312 0.057 0.003 -
The table compares the sample of participants in the survey experiment with the
sample of invited non-participants using the available data from university records.
The available variables are student age, an indicator for the student being female,
the students study experience as measured by the earned number of ECTS points
(European Credit Transfer System), as well as indicators for field of study. Each row
corresponds to a different variable. The first numerical columns shows the variable mean
among participants, while the second column shows the mean among non-participants.
The third and fourth columns show the difference in means between the groups and the
p-value for a t-test that the means are the same. The last column shows the p-values
for a Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test that the distributions of the variable is the same across
the two groups.
To asses whether our results are driven by selective nonparticipation, we implement
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a correction based on inverse probability weighting. We estimate a logit model for
participation in the experiment across all invitees. We use the six variables in Table 26 as
explanatory variables in the logit model. This generates, for each student, a predicted
probability of participating in the experiment. We then weight each observation with the
inverse of this probability in our regression. To obtain standard errors, we use a bootstrap
procedure that resamples the full set of invitees.
Tables 27 through 29 show the results. Throughout, the point estimates are close to
those of the unweighted regressions in the main text. Although we can never rule out that
there is selection on unobservables, there is little evidence that the results presented in
the main text are affected by selective non-participation.
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Table 27: Estimated cheat rates and public service preferences with reweighting to correct
for non-participation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Public administation ranked ≤ 2 −0.084∗
(0.034)
Higher ranking of public administration −0.018∗
(0.008)
Public service motivation score −0.103∗
(0.042)
Public sector picked at current wage −0.069∗
(0.034)
Probability of public administration −0.173
(0.153)
Constant 0.418∗∗ 0.322∗∗ 0.633∗∗ 0.403∗∗ 0.419∗∗
(0.027) (0.025) (0.114) (0.023) (0.043)
The table shows weighted regressions of students’ estimated cheat rates on various measures
of public service job preferences. The applied weights are the inverse of the predicted
participation probability from a logit-model that includes age, an indicator variable for being
male, study experience as measured by earned number of ECTS points and indicators for field
of study. The job preference measures are an indicator for whether public administration was
ranked in the top two of the eight job categories, the flipped actual ranked given to public
administration (so that a higher value means a stronger preference for public administration),
the public service motivation score, an indicator for whether the public sector was picked
in the wage scenario corresponding to the current wage gap and the subjective probability
of ending up in public administration. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses.
∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01.
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Table 28: Estimated cheat rates and student characteristics with reweighting to correct
for non-participation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
GPA (standardized) 0.035 0.041
(0.024) (0.024)
Picks risky lottery 0.045 0.044
(0.035) (0.030)
Job security ranked ≤ 2 0.007 0.013
(0.044) (0.041)
Donation −0.014∗∗ −0.014∗∗
(0.003) (0.002)
Wage ranked ≤ 2 0.082∗ 0.046
(0.035) (0.032)
Male 0.077∗ 0.046
(0.034) (0.031)
Constant 0.390∗∗ 0.363∗∗ 0.384∗∗ 0.474∗∗ 0.361∗∗ 0.344∗∗ 0.423∗∗
(0.015) (0.030) (0.019) (0.032) (0.023) (0.027) (0.039)
The table shows weighted regressions of students’ estimated cheat rates on various measures
of other student attributes. The applied weights are the inverse of the predicted participation
probability from a logit-model that includes age, an indicator variable for being male, study
experience as measured by earned number of ECTS points and indicators for field of study. The
measures of other attributes are GPA standardized by field, an indicator for choosing the one of
the two most risky lotteries, the amount donated in the dictator game, an indicator for being
male and indicators for whether job security and wage was ranked in the top two of the five job
characteristics. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01.
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Table 29: Preference for public service and student characteristics with reweighting to
correct for non-participation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
GPA (standardized) 0.027 0.029
(0.025) (0.028)
Picks risky lottery −0.043 −0.036
(0.046) (0.042)
Job security ranked ≤ 2 −0.007 −0.032
(0.060) (0.058)
Donation 0.011∗∗ 0.009∗∗
(0.003) (0.003)
Wage ranked ≤ 2 −0.178∗∗ −0.163∗∗
(0.046) (0.042)
Male −0.117∗ −0.085
(0.048) (0.046)
Constant 0.402∗∗ 0.419∗∗ 0.399∗∗ 0.330∗∗ 0.449∗∗ 0.459∗∗ 0.458∗∗
(0.021) (0.037) (0.024) (0.032) (0.029) (0.036) (0.048)
The table shows weighted regressions of an indicator for students ranking public administration
in the top two of the eight job categories on various measures of other student attributes. The
applied weights are the inverse of the predicted participation probability from a logit-model
that includes age, an indicator variable for being male, study experience as measured by earned
number of ECTS points and indicators for field of study. The measures of other attributes are
GPA standardized by field, an indicator for choosing the one of the two most risky lotteries, the
amount donated in the dictator game, an indicator for being male and indicators for whether
job security and wage was ranked in the top two of the five job characteristics. Bootstrapped
standard errors are in parentheses. ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01.
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A.10 Translation of the Initial Survey Invitation Mail
Figure 12 shows the translated text from the invitation e-mail for the experiment.
Figure 12: Invitation e-mail for the experiment
From: Survey research, University of Copenhagen
Subject: You are invited to a scientific survey from the University of
Copenhagen
Dear [salutation],
We would very much like you to participate in a scientific survey. You will be
paid for participating in the survey.
The survey deals with attitudes towards the world and how you act in situations
characterized by uncertainty. It will only take 20 minutes to complete.
It is very important to us that many people participate so we will be very
grateful if you take the time to participate. For the same reason we have also
chosen to give a high remuneration: The average participant will earn at least
50 DKK but the maximum reward exceeds 300 DKK.
Press this link to participate in the survey: [link]
You will have to provide a user name and password to participate.
Your username is: [username]
Your password is: [password]
If you have any questions or comment regarding the survey then you are welcome
to respond back to this email address ([e-mail]).
Thank for your participation.
Kind regards,
Department of Economics
University of Copenhagen
Oster Farimagsgade 5
Building 26
1353 Copenhagen K
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A.11 Screencaps and Instructions from Survey Experiment
Below we present translated instructions and screencaps from the survey experiment:
A.11.1 Dice Guessing Game, Instructions and Screenshots
You have now responded to the first series of questions.
The purpose now is to see how you guess in situations marked by randomness. You
will play 10 rounds of a dice game in which you can win money in each round.
You have to guess what the die will show. The more die rolls you guess, the more
money you will win.
Each round of the game proceeds like this:
1. First, you will have to guess a number of dots from 1 to 6. When you have made
your guess you can press the continue bottom.
2. Hereafter a die will roll and you will be asked to report the number of dots which
you guessed earlier.
3. The next screen will show the result of the round. If your guess matched the number
of dots on the die then you will win 3 DKK, else you will win 1 DKK.
You should avoid using the back bottom during the dice games as it might delete your
total winnings.
Note: it is important that you are careful about remembering and reporting the exact
number of dots which you guessed prior to rolling the die.
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Figure 13: Intro screen to first set of dice games as viewed by the respondent
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Figure 14: Dice game test screen as viewed by the respondent
Figure 15: Intro screen: Guess a number between 1 and 6. Hereafter, press the bottom
below in order to throw with the digital die.
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Figure 16: Intro screen: Guess report screen (following a three second animation of
spinning die): The die throw was six. Which number did you guess? Please report in the
field:
Figure 17: Intro screen: Payoff screen (in case of wrong guess): Your guess did not match
the die. You win 1 DKK. Your combined winnings in the survey amounts to 16 DKK.
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A.11.2 Dictator Game, Instructions and Screenshots
Welcome to the study. Before we proceed, you are given a gift of 15 DKK (2.75 USD) as
an appreciation of the time you spend on the survey.
After the survey you will have the option to get this sum automatically transferred to
your bank account together with the additional rewards you collect in the survey. But
you can also choose to donate some of the money to one of the following charities:
• The Danish Cancer Society (Kræftens Bekæmpelse)
• DanChurchAid (Folkekirkens Nødhjælp)
• Save the Children (Red Barnet)
• Amnesty International
• Red Cross (Røde Kors)
Depending on how much you choose to donate we will additionally donate the amount
provided in the below schema of donation options:
Your donation Our donation Total donation
Option A 0 DKK 0 DKK 0 DKK
Option B 5 DKK 3 DKK 8 DKK
Option C 10 DKK 4 DKK 14 DKK
Option D 15 DKK 4 DKK 19 DKK
Which of the donation options do you choose?
• Option A
• Option B
• Option C
• Option D
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Figure 18: Donation screen as viewed by the respondent
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A.11.3 Lottery Choice, Instructions and Screenshots
The survey does, as already mentioned, among other things, deal with your decisions
in situations marked by randomness. Among the participants in the study we draw a
subset which participate in a simple coin-flip lottery. About one in ten participants will
be selected to participate.
If you are selected to participate in the lottery a virtual coin will be flipped and you
will win an amount of money depending on if the coin shows heads or tails. You can
choose how the reward depends on the coin flip from the list of possible options below:
Payoff if heads Payoff if tails
Option A 200 DKK 0 DKK
Option B 160 DKK 30 DKK
Option C 140 DKK 40 DKK
Option D 120 DKK 50 DKK
Option E 80 DKK 80 DKK
Which of the donation options do you choose?
• Option A
• Option B
• Option C
• Option D
• Option E
Please press forward when you have made your choice. You will be informed about if
you have been selected to participate in the lottery by the end of the survey.
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Figure 19: Lottery screen as viewed by the respondent
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